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LIES, DAMN LIES, AND ANTI-DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH'
GEORGE BRAUCHLERt
RICH ORMANt
ABSTRACT

The authors are two prosecutors with experience in Colorado capital
litigation. They examine and scrutinize the claims and methodology of
two prior articles, Death Eligibility in Colorado:Many Are Called, Few
Are Chosen (Many Are Called) and DisquietingDiscretion: Race, Geography & the ColoradoDeath Penalty in the First Decade of the TwentyFirst Century (Disquieting Discretion). The prior articles criticize the
death penalty in Colorado and make claims about racial disparity, and in
the opinion of the authors, accuse Colorado prosecutors of racial bias in
the death penalty process. The authors examine Colorado's death penalty
from a practitioner's perspective, examine the history of Colorado's
death penalty, reveal the bias and failures of the defendant-initiated
"study" relied upon in the prior articles, and conclude that the criticisms
of Colorado's death penalty are inaccurate and without merit. Finally,
any geographic disparity in the pursuit of the death penalty within Colorado is most attributable to the disparity in available resources between
the state-funded public defenders and the county-funded prosecutors.

1.
"Lies, damned lies, and statistics" is a phrase relating to the improper use of statistics to
prove any proposition, which is attributed to Mark Twain, who attributed it to Disraeli. MARK
TWAIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, VOLUME I, at 228 (2010).
District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District (Arapahoe, Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln
t
counties), Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Lieutenant Colonel, Colorado Army National Guard, J.D., University of Colorado School of Law, B.A., University
of Colorado at Boulder. Mr. Brauchler has practiced law in Colorado for more than twenty years as a
prosecutor, criminal defense attorney, and civil litigator. He has conducted trials in state, Federal,
municipal, and military courts, including the Aurora Theater Massacre trial tried in Arapahoe County in 2015. Mr. Brauchler has taught at the Sturm College of Law since 2002 and previously taught
as an Adjunct Professor at the University of Colorado School of Law and the Judge Advocate General Legal Center and School for the U.S. Army in the areas of Basic and Advanced Criminal Procedure, Trial Advocacy, Litigation Technology, Jury Selection, and Military Justice. He has taught in
the areas of criminal law, military justice, and trial advocacy across the country and in several countries for numerous organizations and every branch of the U.S. Armed Forces.
t Chief Deputy District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, J.D., Georgetown University
Law Center, B.A., University of Colorado at Boulder. In twenty-five years of legal practice, Mr.
Orman has worked as a prosecutor and in civil practice in Denver and Aspen, and as a criminal
defense attorney in Baltimore, Maryland.
The Authors wish to extend their sincere appreciation for the invaluable experience,
expertise, contributions, and input shared by Daniel W. Edwards, Senior Assistant Attorney General
for Colorado. He was of tremendous assistance to us in the writing of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

In Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen (Many Are Called), University of Denver Sturm College of Law
Professors Justin Marceau and Sam Kamin and Rowan University Professor Wanda Foglia (the Authors) argue that Colorado's death penalty
statute is unconstitutional because the law permits too many homicide
cases to be treated as death penalty cases.2 In their follow-up article, Disquieting Discretion:Race, Geography & the Colorado Death Penalty in
the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century (DisquietingDiscretion),
which is based upon the same "original research" as Many Are Called,
the Professors-Marceau and Kamin, Meg Beardsley, and Scott Phillips-claim that Colorado prosecutors are racially motivated in their decisions to seek-or not to seek-the death penalty and that the Eighteenth Judicial District is the worst offender.
The original research is goal-oriented, biased, and flawed.4 Even a
cursory review demonstrates that the Authors did not base their "original
research" on a scientific, or even pseudoscientific, methodology. Original, honest, and scientific research gathers facts and evidence, examines
the facts and evidence, and then reaches a hypothesis or theory. This
"original research" did the opposite. The Authors cherry-picked convenient "facts" in order to fit those facts into,5 and thus "prove," a preconceived notion. The resulting accusations are not only unreliable, they are
6
demonstrably false. This Article is, in part, a rebuttal to those outrageous claims and the biased "data" upon which they are purportedly
based. This Article will not attempt to detail the many justifications for
maintaining the death penalty as a matter of justice and public policy, nor
will it describe the ways in which Colorado's current death penalty laws

2.
See Justin Marceau et al., Death Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are
Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (2013). Although uncited by the Authors, the phrase
"many are called, few are chosen" comes from Matthew 22:14 (King James).
3.
Meg Beardsley et al., Disquieting Discretion: Race, Geography & The Colorado Death
Penalty in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 431,431,433 (2015).
4.
See infra Part IV.
5.
For a discussion of the source of the data set used in this study, see Marceau et al., supra
note 2, at 1070 n. 1, and infra Part IV.C.
6.
See argument infra Part IV.
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can be improved and made consistent with other states and Federal death
penalty laws.
A. Bottom Line Up Front
In the course of litigation, you sometimes observe things. Here is
what I (Brauchler) observed: the defense attorneys for a double murderer
(one of whose victims was the murderer's infant daughter) facing the
death penalty7 sought, and ultimately found, anti-death penalty academics to help the defense team in attempting to keep their client from receiving the death penalty for his second murder.8 These academics had
no experience actually practicing law in Colorado, much less practicing
criminal law in Colorado, and much less practicing capital litigation in
Colorado.9 Indeed, they had negligible experience actually practicing
criminal law at all. The defense attorneys got their handpicked academics
to examine defense selected and screened data in order to reach what to
me (Brauchler), as a participant in the litigation, was a predetermined
conclusion.'o The conclusion sought by the defense would support the
defense's goal of striking down the death penalty statute that their client
faced. Their efforts failed in court. But as the old saying goes, when life
gives you lemons, you make lemonade. So, the academics took the defense provided research-so far rejected by all three Colorado trial court
judges who have been asked to consider it"-and turned it into a law
7.

See People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 492 (Colo. 2007).

8.
Cf Karen Aug6, Edward Montour to Get New Trial in Killing of Corrections Officer,
DENVER POST (Apr. 9, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_22988352/edwardmontour-to-get-new-trial.
9.
Justin Marceau states prior experience as an Assistant Federal Public Defender in Arizona
and as counsel in federal habeas of death penalty cases. Faculty Profile, Justin Marceau, U. DENV.
STURM C. L., http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/justin-marceau (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
Sam Kamin claims no practical legal experience. Faculty Profile, Sam Kamin, U. DENv. STURM C.
L., http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/profile/sam-kamin (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). Wanda Foglia
claims experience as a local prosecutor in Pennsylvania for two years in the mid-1980s. C. V. of
Wanda
D.
Foglia,
ROWAN
U.,
http://www.rowan.edulopen/RUFaculty/cydf/Dr.%20Foglia's%20CV.pdf
(last visited Apr. I1,

2016).
10.
The defense attorneys had the selected academics support their motion attacking the
Colorado death penalty in a specific case. This is the essence of the finding of the court in the People

v. Lewis. See Denial of Defendant's Motions DL-D-3, 27, 39 and 102 C-61 at 5-10 , People v.
Lewis, 12CR4743 (Denver Dist. Ct.) [hereinafter Order C-61 ]; see also Marceau et al., supra note 2,

at 1070 n.1.
I1. See Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to Declare C.R.S.

§

18-1.3-1201 (2012) Uncon-

stitutional Because it Fails to Sufficiently Narrow the Class of Individuals Eligible for the Death

Penalty (D-157), People v. Holmes, 12CRI522 (Arapahoe Cty. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2014) [hereinafter
Order D-157]; Order [2013-05-02] D-181, People v. Montour, 02CR782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct.
May 2, 2013) [hereinafter Order D-181]; Order C-61, supra note 10, at 5-10. Specifically referencing the Authors' study in their Death Eligibility article, the Holmes court found that "[t]he study
suffers from the . . . flaw . . . [that] its focus is solely on statutory aggravating factors. . . . [I]ts conclusion-that at least one aggravating factor potentially applied to 90.4% of first-degree murders
examined-is nothing more than a red herring." Order D-157, supra, at 8-7. Citing the Authors'
study from the Marceau, Kamin, & Foglia, Death Eligibility article, the Lewis court stated "it is clear
it was not an unbiased study, but one designed to provide support for a particular position and designed to reach an anticipated conclusion." Order C-61, supra note 10, at 5. The court went on to
question the bias of a study commissioned by "a defendant facing a death penalty prosecution" and
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review article. Then, the same anti-death penalty academics used the
same incomplete, untrustworthy, and unscientifically gathered data to
impugn the motives of prosecutors throughout Colorado.1 2 Over the past
fifteen years, budget-not bias-has led to the limitation of capital prosecutions to those metro area District Attorneys' offices that have the resources to match the exploding and unchecked budgets of the Public
Defender and Alternate Defense Counsel.1 3
B. Our Background and Bias
In any academic paper attempting to influence litigation or policy
through original research or other statistical analysis, the proponents of
the research and conclusions should disclose to the reader their relevant
backgrounds and positions on the ultimate issue of the paper, in other
words: their bias. Only by knowing the bias and background of the Authors can a reader fairly scrutinize the "research" and conclusions purportedly supported by it. Because the Authors fail to do so in either of
their articles, we will do so here.
We are both prosecutors. We are both also former criminal defense
attorneys. Combined, we have practiced criminal law in Colorado courts
for 44 years.
We are pro-death penalty. That is to say, we are in favor of the potential use of the death penalty as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
by a District Attorney elected by the population with whom the District
Attorney works to enforce the law and seek justice. We are both seasoned prosecutors who have also worked as defense attorneys. Between
us, we have conducted hundreds of jury trials in Colorado.
George Brauchler has been the elected District Attorney of the
Eighteenth Judicial District, the most populous jurisdiction in Colorado, 14 since January 2013. He made the decision to seek the death penalty
against the shooter in the Aurora Theater Massacre, a case we both par-

stated "those same defense attorneys, along with paralegals and interns, collected and presented the
data for the authors' review and the participation of the defendant's attorneys and their staff creates
an even greater bias concern." Id. The court likened the methodology used by the Authors as
"GIGO, which stands for Garbage In, Garbage Out." Id at 6. The court also concluded that "the
approach taken to identify death penalty eligible cases was guaranteed to overestimate the instances
in which the death penalty would ever be sought." Id. at 7.
12.
Throughout Disquieting Discretion, the word "race" appears twenty-five times, "racial"
appears sixty-two times, and "discrimination" appears fifteen times. See generally Beardsley et al.,
supra note 3. The Authors include a direct statement that Colorado prosecutors' use of the death
penalty "might be the result of implicit biases as opposed to explicit showings of racial discrimination." Id. at 443 n.62. Conversely, "disparate impact" appears only three times. See generally id.

13.

See infra App. E.

14.
COLO. JUDICIAL DEP'T, THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT STATE OF COLORADO
OVERVIEW
(2016),
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/CourtProbation/Supreme Court/Judicial Nominating
Commissions/Overviews/I 8Overview.pdf.
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ticipated in prosecuting.15 The mass murderer is a highly educated white
man from a privileged background who sought to massacre hundreds of
innocent people, but was successful in "only" murdering twelveincluding six-year-old Veronica Moser-Sullivan-and wounding seventy
others, including paralyzing and causing the miscarriage of Veronica's
mother, who sat next to her in the theater.
The Authors of Many Are Called and DisquietingDiscretion are anti-death penalty. There is, of course, nothing wrong with that. However,
they should not be perceived, in any way, as disinterested, unbiased academics examining a problem and reaching a conclusion. In our opinion,
there is no version, method, or legal procedure involving the death penalty that they would ever support. We believe their goal is to see the death
penalty abolished, and their published research is a means to that end. 16 It
is that ideological mindset-undisclosed in their papers-that appears to
have influenced their outcome-based research and analysis.
An unbiased review of all relevant facts and the pertinent law-not
just the Authors handpicked ones-reveals a far different outcome than
that advocated by the anti-death penalty Authors. The specific conclusions are fourfold:
1. Coloradans overwhelmingly want to maintain the death penalty;
2. Colorado's death penalty statutes make the death penalty more difficult to obtain than in any other state in the United States, or even in
Federal Court;
3. The race of the defendant is not a factor in the determination to
pursue the death penalty in Colorado;
4. The vast disparity between the resources available to District Attorneys' offices outside of the Denver-metro area, when compared
with the exploding and unscrutinized budget of the statewide public
defender's office, accounts for any geographic disparity in the pursuit
of the death penalty in Colorado.
II. COLORADANS SUPPORT THE DEATH PENALTY
Those who seek to permanently end the death penalty in Colorado
recognize that they are unlikely to do so through the democratic process,
either through the legislature or at the ballot box. A brief history of the
death penalty in Colorado demonstrates Coloradans' strong interest in
maintaining capital punishment in the state.
15.
We were both involved in all aspects of the Aurora Theater Case prosecution and will
refer to events in this case based on our own personal knowledge and experience.
16.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Specifically citing the Authors' study from the
Marceau, Kamin, & Foglia, Death Eligibility article, the Lewis court stated "it is clear it was not an
unbiased study, but one designed to provide support for a particular position and designed to reach
an anticipated conclusion." Order C-6 1, supra note 10, at 5.
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In 1861, "the death penalty was formally instituted as a means of
punishment in Colorado.,"17 Since the beginning, Colorado has historically used the death penalty sparingly. In the thirty years from 1859 to
1889, "a total of 25 men were legally hanged,"' 8 the exclusive method of
execution during that time. From 1890-1933, there were "45 executions
by hanging in Caion City."l 9 A brief period of abolition of the death
penalty beginning in 1897 resulted in new death penalty legislation only
four years later in 1901.20 In the thirty-eight years from 1934-1972, thirty-two men were executed.2 1 In 1966, the legislature's attempt to repeal
the death penalty by public referendum "failed by a nearly two-to-one
margin." 22 After the U.S. Supreme Court's Furman v. Georgia23 decision
in 1972, Colorado voters approved new death penalty legislation-again
by more than 60%-only two years later, in 1974.24 In 1978, the Colorado Supreme Court struck down the death penalty, only to have the legislature amend and correct the statute in 1979.25
In September 1991, less than three months after the Colorado Supreme Court yet again struck down the death penalty statute, the legislature repealed the old statute and passed a new one.26 Pursuant to the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Walton v. Arizona,2 7 the General Assembly
passed a statute that permitted a three-judge panel to decide the life sen28
tence or death sentence issue. However, in June 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona29 struck down the three-judge panel used
in death penalty cases since 1995. Less than three weeks later, "Colorado
became the first state to pass legislation that . .. would bring the state
into compliance with Ring."0 o
The history that we have discussed above demonstrates that since
before becoming a state, Coloradans have successfully and quickly resisted and reversed every effort to abolish the death penalty.
A. Recent Public Opinion
Recent polling indicates consistent and overwhelming support for
maintaining the death penalty in Colorado. In December 2012, The Colo17.

1999, 77
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Stephanie Hindson et al., Race, Gender, Region And Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980-

U. COLO. L. REV. 549, 553 (2006).
Id
Id at 554.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 554-55.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 555.

25.
Id. at 555-56.
26.
Id. at 556.
27.
497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
28.
Colorado Session Laws, Ch. 244, sec. 1, § 16-11-103 (1995); see also Woldt v. People,
64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003); Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 556-57.
29.
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
30.

Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 557.
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rado Observer published a poll conducted by Dave Sackett, one of the
most well-known public opinion researchers in the United States.31 Sixty-eight percent of respondents opposed abolishing the death penalty,
compared with twenty-seven percent who favored ending capital punishment. 3 2 In December 1993, Nathan Dunlap chose to seek revenge for
being fired by the Chuck E. Cheese restaurant in Aurora, Colorado. 3 3 He
murdered Ben Grant, Marge Kohlberg, Sylvia Crowell, and 17 year-old
Colleen O'Connor, while she begged for her life. 34 A fifth potential victim, Bobby Stephens, escaped to report Dunlap's crimes. 3 5 Support for
the death penalty increased to 69% when respondents were told that
abolishing the death penalty would lead to a commutation of mass murderer Nathan Dunlap's death sentence. 36
A poll conducted by the Quinnipiac University Polling Institute
from June 5-10, 2013, found that 69% of Coloradans wanted the death
penalty to remain the law, compared to 24% who opposed the death penalty.37 The same poll found that 67% of Coloradans believed that Governor John Hickenlooper's decision to reprieve convicted and condemned
mass murderer Nathan Dunlap less than two weeks earlier was wrong. 38
Even an informal, online poll by the Denver Post in 2013 indicated
that 67% of respondents believed that mass murderer Dunlap, who murdered four people and seriously injured a fifth, should have been executed instead of Governor Hickenlooper granting a reprieve. 39
In short, Coloradans-by historically wide and consistent margins-want the death penalty to remain the law of the land.

31.
See POLL: Coloradans Favor Keeping Death Penalty by Large Margin, COLO.
OBSERVER (Dec. 31, 2012) [hereinafter POLL], http://thecoloradoobserver.com/2012/12/pollcoloradans-favor-death-penalty-by-large-margin/.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
People v. Dunlap (DunlapI), 975 P.2d 723, 733 (Colo. 1999).
Id. at 734.
Id.

36.
POLL, supra note 31. Dunlap was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder, attempted murder, robbery, and burglary in 1996 and was sentenced to death and an additional 113

years. See Dunlap v. People (Dunlap III), 173 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2007); People v. Dunlap
(Dunlap II), 36 P.3d 778, 779 (Colo. 2001); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 733. During his sentencing hearing, Dunlap launched into a profanity-laden tirade directed at the family of a murder victim. Con-

demned Killer Unleashes Rage in

Court, DENV.

POST (Feb.

19,

2013,

12:01

AM),

http://www.denverpost.com/arvada/ci_22637314/condemned-killer-unleashes-rage-

court?source=pkg (originally published May 18, 1996).
37.
Opinion, What Poll Means for the Death Penalty in Colorado, DENV. POST (June 14,
2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_23455324/what-poll-means-death-penalty; Press
Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Colorado Voters Back Death Penalty Almost 3-1, Quinnipiac University

Poll

Finds;

Early

Look

Shows

Close

Governor's

Race

in

2014

(June

13,

2013),

https://www.qu.edu/news-and-events/quinnipiac-university-poll/colorado/release-

detail?ReleaselD=l 907.
38. Id.
39.
Daniel Edwards, The Reality of Evolving Standards and the Death Penalty: Part I,
PROSECUTOR, Jan.-Mar. 2014, at 28, 30.
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Public opinion matters to the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,40 held that public opinion is a factor
in the consideration of what might be "cruel and unusual" under the
Eighth Amendment. 4 1 The Court held that "the Clause forbidding 'cruel
and unusual' punishment 'is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."' 4 2
"Thus, an assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction of
a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment."4 3 As the Court indicated in 1976, and continuing to this
day, "[d]espite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century,
over the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now evident that
a large proportion of American society continues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction."44
Thus, opponents of the death penalty in Colorado have turned their
attention to the courts-unsuccessfully-for years. To understand the
most recently attempted legal attack, it is necessary to understand the
current Colorado death penalty.
III. OVERVIEW OF COLORADO'S CURRENT DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
Colorado's death penalty statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-1.3-1201(2),
is unique. Our opinion is that the statute and case law interpreting the
statute4 5 make the procedure for obtaining the death penalty in Colorado
the most difficult in the United States. The Colorado statute requires the
jury to proceed through four steps in determining the appropriate sentence after an offender has been convicted of a class-one felony:4 6
(1) proving statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) considering mitigation limited by only a relevance requirement; (3)
requiring that the jury make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
mitigation does not outweigh the statutory aggravating factors found in
step one; and (4) selecting an appropriate punishment between life without parole or the death penalty, during which any individual juror can
decide that life is the appropriate punishment.47 The court is required to
impose a life sentence if any one of the jurors does not agree that the
prosecution has not proven a statutory aggravating factor, or that mitigation outweighs the statutory aggravating factors, or by determining that
40. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
41.
Id. at 171.
42.
Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
43.
Id. at 173.
44.
Id. at 179.
45.
See, e.g., Dunlap I, 975 P.2d 723, 735-36 (Colo. 1999) (effectively creating a two-phase
or three-phase sentencing hearing); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1990) (setting
forth the procedures for the four-stage process discussed below).
46.
Colorado has three class-one felony offenses for which the death penalty theoretically
applies: first degree murder; first degree kidnapping where the victim dies in the course of the kid-

napping; and Treason. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2015); id. § 18-3-301(2); id.
47.
Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735-36; Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 791-92.

§

18-11-101.
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life is the appropriate punishment. According to the Colorado Supreme
Court, the first three are the "eligibility" steps. 4 8 The fourth is the actual
imposition of the sentence or "selection" step. 49 The Colorado Supreme
Court has held that this statute is constitutional against every attack
against it.50
A. The ColoradoDeath Penalty Statute Narrows the Pool ofDeath Penalty Eligible MurderersMore Than Any Other Statute in the United
States
Only one murderer, Gary Davis, has been executed in Colorado
since 1976, when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Georgia death penalty procedure that incorporated a bifurcation of guilt
and punishment and allowed the parties to present additional evidence in
aggravation and mitigation.51 Yet death penalty opponents have argued
that the Colorado death penalty can be applied too often.52 Too often!
University of Denver Sturm College of Law professors Marceau
and Kamin have recently claimed that the death penalty in Colorado has
two main constitutional faults: (1) that it is too broad by failing to narrow
the class of people eligible for the death penalty, and (2) almost comically, that it is too narrow because it is sought against too few defendants. 5 3
Death penalty opponents want it both ways on two issues: that it is unconstitutional both because it is too broad and because it is too narrow
and that it is unconstitutional because it is imposed too often and not
imposed frequently enough.
Of course, more than just the death penalty statute needs to be considered in determining whether the Colorado scheme constitutionally
narrows the group of individuals who are eligible for the death penalty.
In fact, Colorado takes extreme, unprecedented, and unique steps to narrow the scope of the death penalty.
First, Colorado narrows in the statutory definition of "first degree
murder" more than most other states that have the death penalty for first
degree murder. In the most utilized theory of first degree murder in the
statute, the law requires that the prosecution prove that "[a]fter deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a person other than himself,
[the murderer caused] the death of that person." 54 Of the thirty-three
48. Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d at 735.
49. Id.
50. E.g., Dunlap III, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092-93 (Colo. 2007) (finding the statute constitutional
and in full compliance with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862 (1983)); Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 790-91; People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 170-71 (Colo. 1990),
overruled by People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo. 2005).
51. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-98, 207.
52.
53.

See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1113.
See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.

981, 1019-22 (2015); Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1071-75.
54. COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(l)(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
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states that have the death penalty, seventeen require lesser culpability by
requiring either just an intentional or knowing murder.5 5 In those seventeen states (i.e., 51% of states that have the death penalty), a murderer is
thus eligible for the death penalty for what would be second degree murder in Colorado, where the murderer would not be eligible for death penalty consideration at all.
In a nutshell, the sentencing phase of a capital trial can be divided
into two phases, or functions: (1) eligibility for the death sentence and
(2) a decision as to whether the defendant should receive the death sentence or a different sentence.56 This first part, eligibility, can also be referred to as "narrowing," in that it narrows the class of murderers eligible
for the death penalty, because it "channel[s] and limit[s] the jury's discretion to ensure that the death penalty is a proportionate punishment and
therefore not arbitrary or capricious in its imposition."57 Constitutionally,
this serves the purpose of providing a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases
in which it is not."58 Indeed, "[n]o court, not the U.S. Supreme Court, not
any federal inferior court, not any state court, and specifically no Colorado court has ever found a death penalty statute to be unconstitutional
based upon the number of aggravating factors in a particular statute."
There are only two requirements for aggravating factors to pass constitutional muster: (1) "the circumstance may not apply to every defendant
convicted of murder, it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder," and (2) "the aggravating [factor must] not be unconstitutionally vague." 60
The Colorado death penalty statute61 (the Colorado Statute) narrows
the pool of death eligible defendants more than any other jurisdiction in
the United States.62 The Colorado Statute provides for both eligibility
55.
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah. See

infra Apps. B & F.
56.
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 296 (1998) ("Petitioner initially recognizes, as he must,
that our cases have distinguished between two different aspects of the capital sentencing process, the
eligibility phase and the selection phase. In the eligibility phase, the jury narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, often through consideration of aggravating circumstances. In
the selection phase, the jury determines whether to impose a death sentence on an eligible defendant.").

57.
58.

Id. at 275-76.
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,

188 (1976)) (striking down as unconstitutional an aggravating factor based on a finding that the
offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.").
59.
Daniel Edwards, The Reality of Evolving Standards and the Death Penalty: Part II,

PROSECUTOR, April- June 2014, at 22 (emphasis omitted).
60.
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994).
61.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2015).
62.
See infra Apps. B & F. Thirty-five jurisdictions including thirty-three states, the U.S.
Government and the U.S. Military have the death penalty as an option for murder in the first degree.
TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013- STATISTICAL TABLES, at 3,

6 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp I3st.pdf.
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and sentencing (or selection). The Colorado Supreme Court has found
that the determination of eligibility consists of the first three steps of the
sentencing hearing:
The eligibility phase of a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible to receive the death penalty. In Colorado, the class of persons eligible to receive the death penalty is narrowed by requiring the jury find the existence of one statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then considers the existence of any mitigating factors and must determine whether mitigation
outweighs aggravation. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that mitigation does not outweigh aggravation, the defendant is
eligible to receive the death penalty and the jury moves to the final selection stage of deliberations.63
Demonstrating a clear understanding of the narrowing requirement
and that this requirement is contained in the jury's progression through
all three steps of eligibility, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
The death penalty eligibility determination includes three steps: finding aggravating factors, finding mitigating factors, and weighing aggravating factors against mitigating factors.6
Therefore, just the eligibility phase of the Colorado Statute requires:
1. A unanimous and beyond a reasonable doubt finding that at least
one aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable doubt;65
2. Presentation of any mitigation by the defense and rebuttal to mitigation by the prosecution-each individual juror assesses whether
mitigation exists;66
3. A finding as to whether mitigation does not outweigh aggravation
beyond a reasonable doubt.67 Each juror gives whatever weight the

63.
64.
65.
66.

Dunlap IH1, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092 (Colo. 2007) (citations omitted).
People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 492 (Colo. 2007).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(d), (2)(a)(1).
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(1 )(d) ("The burden of proof as to the aggravating factors ...

shall be

beyond a reasonable doubt. There shall be no burden of proof as to proving or disproving mitigating
factors.").
See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201. The Colorado Supreme Court on numer67.
ous occasions has held that eligibility requires the three steps and that the Colorado Statute is consti-

tutional. See, e.g., Montour, 157 P.3d at 492; Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 264 (Colo. 2003); Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d 723, 739 (Colo. 1999); People v. Martinez, 970 P.2d 469, 471-73, 476 (Colo. 1998)
(finding no violation right against self-incrimination, due process, effective assistance of counsel,

and equal protection); People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 250, 277 (Colo. 1996) (finding no violation of cruel and unusual or due process clauses); People v. White, 870 P.2d 424, 436-41 (Colo.
1994) (finding no violation of due process, cruel and unusual, or ex post facto clauses); People v.

Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 192-95 (Colo. 1990), overruled by People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo.
2005).
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individual juror decides should be given to any mitigation that he
found to exist.68
Currently, an aggravating factor is any one of the seventeen factors
listed by the Colorado General Assembly in the statute.69 When Nathan
Dunlap committed his murders, there were fifteen aggravating factors. A
mitigating factor can be any of eleven statutory mitigating factors or
"[a]ny other evidence which in the court's opinion bears on the question
of mitigation."7 0 Mitigation must be "relevant to the nature of the crime,
and the character, background, and history of the defendant."
Colorado is the only jurisdiction that requires more than mere proof
of one or more aggravating factors at the eligibility stage. Every other
state uses aggravating factors, either in the guilt phase of trial or as the
first step at the sentencing hearing, as the only eligibility requirement.
The consideration of mitigation and the weighing of that mitigation, in
all other jurisdictions, with the possible exception of Virginia, are sentencing factors, not eligibility factors. Colorado's unique procedure,
providing for the jury's consideration and weighing of aggravation and
mitigation at the eligibility stage makes a tremendous difference to the
prosecution and the murderer, as it may lead to an offender escaping the
possibility of a life or death vote.
B. How the Death Penalty Actually Works: Procedures That Narrow
Eligibility Where the Death Penalty Is Sought
The death penalty process and sentencing scheme can be seen as a
pyramid. Multiple levels provide layer after layer of "narrowing," beginning with the crime, then the decision regarding filing of charges, a determination of guilt at trial, the sentencing phase (eligibility and selection), review by the trial court, post-conviction review, mandatory review
of the death sentence by the Colorado Supreme Court, and other state
and federal appeals. Only after climbing to the apex of the pyramid, and
after any commutation or pardon authority of the Governor, may a court
impose the death penalty.
Elected District Attorneys must consider myriad factors in making
the decision that is consistent with Colorado constitutional, statutory, and
case law.

68.
People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990).
69.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(a)-(q).
70.
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(a)-(1).
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978); People v.
71.
District Court, 586 P.2d 31, 34-36 (Colo. 1978).
72.
See infra App. F.
73.
See infra App. F.
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1. Prosecutor's Decision Making Examples:
1. The bottom layer in the pyramid is the crime itself. The District
Attorney must make a good-faith decision whether he or she can
prove murder in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. After a District Attorney makes a decision on what to charge the
defendant, or submits the case to a grand jury for a probable cause
determination, and authorities conduct a proper investigation, a District Attorney needs to review the facts to determine whether any
statutory aggravating factors exist and appear to be provable beyond
a reasonable doubt.
3. A District Attorney considers the defendant's prior criminal history, or lack of history (can be either aggravating or mitigating).
4. A District Attorney must make a determination after investigation
of what mitigation may exist. This determination usually is performed after a "mitigation meeting" with the defense, where the defense presents the mitigation to the prosecution. Only after considering mitigation does a prosecutor announce that the People of the
State of Colorado will pursue the death penalty.
5. The prosecutor is required to discuss the case with the victim's
family members. 74 There are constitutional, statutory, and practical
requirements concerning victims. Some of those considerations include:
i. A victim's family's position concerning the death penalty;
ii. Any victim's family's concerns with the length of the appeals and post-conviction proceedings until the ultimate
outcome of the case is determined;
iii. Relationship of the victim to the defendant;
iv. Relationship of the defendant to the surviving victim's
family members who may also need to be witnesses. A consideration of the impact upon the victim-witnesses if they
have to testify;
v. A victim's background, criminal and personal histories,
and level of contribution to their own death; and
vi. Number, age, and vulnerability of the victims.
6. The unique legal and factual issues in the case.
7. The weighing of known aggravating factors and known mitigation
by the prosecutor in making the decision.
74.

COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16A.

2016]LIES, DAMN LIES, AND ANTI-DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH649
8. Legal climate-effect of pending legislation and existing appellate
authority.
2. Jury Decision Making
The Colorado death penalty sentencing procedure is set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1201. The jury is required to find the defendant
guilty of first degree murder unanimously and beyond a reasonable
doubt. 5 A sentencing hearing is then conducted.76 At phase one, the jury
must determine whether a statutory aggravating factor has been proven
by a unanimous decision beyond a reasonable doubt.77 At phase two, the
jury hears mitigation evidence from the defense and any rebuttal to mitigation from the prosecution.78 Any individual juror may decide that a
particular mitigating factor exists.79 Also at phase two, the jurors must
determine individually that mitigation outweighs the aggravating factors
that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Each juror decides what is
mitigating and what weight to give any mitigating evidence. The only
items the jurors can consider at this phase in aggravation are the statutory
aggravating factors.80 Only if a statutory aggravating factor has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and mitigation does not outweigh aggravation, as determined individually but unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt, can the jurors proceed to the final phase, selection of the sentence.81
At the selection phase, the parties can introduce further evidence.
The defendant can introduce other mitigation. The prosecution can introduce aggravating circumstances (i.e., facts that are not statutory factors
but are factors that speak to the impact of the crime on the victims; the
circumstances of the crime; and the character, background, and history of
the defendant).82 The aggravating circumstances, including victimimpact evidence, can only be presented after the jury finds that the defendant is eligible for the death penalty.8 3 The jurors decide the appropriate sentence between a life sentence and the death penalty.m Despite the
eligibility finding, if any individual juror decides (unconstrained by any
75.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(a). Technically, the jury is required to convict the
defendant of a class-one felony offense, which includes first degree murder, id. § 18-3-102, treason,
id.

§

18-11-101, first degree kidnapping when death occurs, id.

§

18-3-301, and certain assaults

during escape attempts by individuals convicted of class-one felonies, id. § 18-8-206. We have been
unable to find any reference in a Colorado appellate decision to the prosecution seeking the death
penalty for any crime other than first degree murder.

76.
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(l)(a)-(b).
77.
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(l)(d), (2).
78.
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2).
79.
See id. § 18-1.3-1201(4); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978); Dunlap
III, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092-93 (Colo. 2007); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 790-91 (Colo. 1990);
People v. District Court, 586 P.2d 31, 34-36 (Colo. 1978).
80. See Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 790-91.
81.
Id.
82.
COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-1.3-1201(1)(b); see also DunlapIII, 173 P.3d at 1092-93.
83. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(l)(b).
84. Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a).
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burden of proof) that life is the appropriate sentence, the defendant is
sentenced to life without parole.85
3. Trial Court Decision Making
The trial court is required to review a death sentence to determine
whether "the verdict of the jury is clearly erroneous as contrary to the
weight of the evidence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment." 86 Further, if the jury verdict is not unanimous, the court is required to sentence the defendant to life.87
After a verdict and sentence, the defendant can exercise his rights
under the Unitary Review in Death Penalty Cases.88 The trial court is
required to set a date for execution and then stay that date pending review.8 Two separate proceedings occur: (1) a post-conviction review
similar to that provided by Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c),
and (2) a direct appeal. 90 In the People v. Owens 91 and People v. Ray 9 2
cases, the court appointed for each defendant four taxpayer-funded attorneys to do the post-conviction review and four attorneys as direct-appeal
counsel. 9 3 Thus, at this point, eight taxpayer-funded attorneys represented each defendant. Sir Mario Owens filed a post-conviction motion that
was over 1,000 pages in length. 94 Hearings on the Owens post-conviction
petition are currently proceeding. Only after the court issues an order can
the defendant then exercise his right to the direct appeal and the postconviction-review appeal.
4. Colorado Supreme Court Review
The Colorado Supreme Court not only considers the usual appellate
issues, but must make specific determinations as to the death penalty 9 5
Whenever a sentence of death is imposed upon a person pursuant to
the provisions of this section, the supreme court shall review the propriety of that sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense, the
character and record of the offender, the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and
96
accuracy of the information on which it was based.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id § I8-1.3-1201(2)(d).
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(c).
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(d).
Id. § 16-12-201(1).
Id. § 16-12-204(l).
Id. § 16-12-204(2).
228 P.3d 969 (Colo. 2010).
252 P.3d 1042 (Colo. 2011).
See, e.g., id at 1044; Owens, 228 P.3d at 969-70.
This motion was filed with court and is being actively litigated in our office.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(6) (2015).
Id. § 18-1.3-1201(6)(a).
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The court also must review the sentence to determine whether the
sentence "was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice or
any other arbitrary factor or that the evidence presented does not support
97
the finding of statutory aggravating circumstances."
5. Federal Court Decision Making
A defendant may seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court of any
constitutional holding by the state appellate courts. Further, a defendant
can take advantage of federal habeas proceedings that proceed through
the federal district court, to the circuit court, and to the U.S. Supreme
Court. 98

The Colorado Statute constitutionally narrows the class of individuals who are eligible for the death penalty by having a three-step procedure of (1) statutory aggravating factors; (2) mitigation; and (3) weighing
of mitigation against statutory aggravating factors. The comprehensiveness of the death penalty statutory scheme and its actual application in
Colorado should assuage any moral or legal concerns with random or
arbitrary application, as there are many constitutionally sufficient layers
of discretion and procedural safeguards in Colorado to ensure that death
is the appropriate punishment.
IV. "THE

STUDY"

In an effort to support their claims that Colorado's death penalty
was unconstitutional and that its use was motivated by racial discrimination, 99 the Authors rely on self-declared original research, which they
later entitle "the Colorado Narrowing Study" (the Study). 00 Examination
of the Study demonstrates that it that suffers from significant subjectivity
on the part of what we can only conclude, based on our interpretation of
the evidence (i.e., in our learned opinions), were nonpractitioner academicians who suffered from bias (whether over, subconscious, or uncon-

97.
98.

Id. § 18-1.3-1201(6)(b).
See 28 U.S.C. 2241, 2254(a) (2012).

99.
In the conclusion to DisquietingDiscretion the authors state:
Colorado's system is thus based on a capital statute that vests extraordinary discretion in the hands
of prosecutors. We now know that this essentially unfettered discretion has been exercised in ways
that should trouble anyone interested in the even-handed application of justice. We have demonstrated that the location of a murder and the color of the killer's skin have far more to do with whether
the death penalty is sought than whether a defendant's crime is among the worst of the worst, as
measured by examining whether the defendant has killed multiple victims.
Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 451. The clear implication is that prosecutors use their discretion in
a racially discriminatory manner.
100.
See Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 443 & n.7 (citing to Many Are Called and stating
"We refer to this study as the Colorado Narrowing Study"). In People v. Montour D-181, Appendix
to Montour Brief, the Authors refer to the same study as the Colorado Death Penalty Eligibility

Study (CDPES). See D-181 (2013-3-29) Appendix to Mr. Montour's Brief in Reply to the Prosecution's Motion to Vacate and to Its Submission of the Prosecution Montour Murder Study (PMMS) at

4, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct., March 29, 2013) [hereinafter D181 Appendix].
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scious), and a cart-before-the-horse, outcome-oriented methodology and,
perhaps most importantly, a dearth of real-world, practical experience.
That unchecked and only lightly revealed subjectivity calls into question
the accuracy of the Study and any attempted argument and policy implications based upon it.
A. "The Experts"
Professors Marceau and Kamin make repeated reference to the "Expert Review Team (ERT)."'o' They, of course, have made themselves the
"experts." It is unclear why the Authors adopt this moniker, instead of
simply stating that they-the Authors-conducted the review of the information they requested. Nonetheless, these self-proclaimed experts
then use the defense-anti-death-penalty identification and selection of
cases. The self-titled experts then use their subjective application to the
biased information. It is, therefore, relevant and important to know what
bias and experience they may bring to their chosen task. Unrevealed in
their article is that the Authors are anti-death penalty attorneys who have
spent the majority of their professional careers attempting to defeat and
strike down the death penalty.' 02
One expert, Professor Justin Marceau, a co-author of the Study and
law review article-is the Animal Legal Defense Fund professor at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law-whose prior criminal law
experience was two years fighting the death penalty as an appellate Assistant Federal Public Defender in Arizona.' 03 At the time of his selfdesignation as an expert for the Study, he had been a licensed attorney
for eight years, four of those as an academician. 104
Another expert, Professor Wanda Foglia, is a twenty-year law professor from Rowan University who publishes in opposition to the death
penalty and testifies across the country on behalf of defendants facing the
death penalty in an attempt to have the death penalty process declared
unconstitutional. 05 Her touted past experience as a criminal law practitioner consists of two years as a prosecutor in the mid-1980s, prior to
entering academia.

06

The third expert, Professor Sam Kamin, is the co-author of the
Study and law review article, a law professor from the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law, and a career academician who has fo-

101.
See, e.g., Marceau et al., supra note 2, at I100.
102.
See sources cited supra note 9.
I 03.
See Faculty Profile, Justin Marceau, supra note 9.
104.
See Curriculum Vitae, Justin Marceau, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM COLLEGE OF
LAW, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/full-time/justin-marceau.pdf

(last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
105.

Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1069 n. 1; see also C. V. of Wanda Foglia,supra note 9.

106.

C V of Wanda Foglia, supra note 9.
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cused significant time advocating against the death penalty. 0 7 It appears
that he has never practiced criminal law anywhere.
It must be noted that, despite the Study's claimed attempt to examine the entire process for case selection, which is purportedly based upon
an application of Colorado statutes and Colorado appellate opinions to
Colorado criminal cases, none of the experts are licensed to practice law
in Colorado.108 One of the most obvious demonstrations of the impact of
inexperience and bias is the experts' statement that "[o]nce a defendant is
convicted of first-degree murder and at least one aggravating factor has
been proven to the jury, the selection question-weighing aggravators
against mitigators-is all that stands between a defendant and a death
sentence."l 09 As detailed below in the discussion of Colorado's capital
punishment scheme, every part of the expert statement is false and contrary to Colorado law.
Additional misstatements of the law appear throughout the Authors'
articles. In criticizing Colorado's first degree murder statute as being
"one of the broadest known in law,"o the Authors claim that Colorado's
inclusion of felony murder "in the definition of first-degree murder is
quite unusual.""' They provide no support for this extreme statement,
which is explained by the fact that the vast majority of States-thirtyeight of them-in the United States have a felony murder statute and
define felony murder as first degree murder. 1 2 Completely contrary to
the claims of the Authors, it is actually unusual for a state to not have a
felony murder statute and not define felony murder as first degree murder.1 13 The failure to research other states' felony murder statutes before
107.
See Faculty Profile, Sam Kamin, supra note 9.
108.
See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1100. The author's lack of experience in criminal law
in Colorado is revealed throughout the article and prior working copies. For example, footnote 162
of the article states "a defendant convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, which is a
class two felony, could be guilty of first degree murder as an accomplice under Colorado law." Id. at
1100 n.162. This is a misstatement of Colorado law. By statutory definition and practical application, conspirators are not a subset of accomplices, nor vice versa. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-

201(1) (2015); id. § 18-1-603. Likewise, the authors make reference to "second-degree felon[ics]"
and "third degree felon[ies]." See, e.g., Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1100, 1115. Colorado does
not classify felonies by degree, but by class. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-206. This is akin to
the "fan" who yells "touchdown!" at a basketball game. Far from mere semantics, this misstatement
of terms used routinely and universally throughout Colorado highlights an unfamiliarity with-and
lack of facility with-the very laws and procedures the authors purport to analyze and critique.
Further, a search of the Colorado Judicial website showed that the authors were not admitted to
practice
law
in
Colorado.
See
Attorney
Lookup,
COLO.
Sup.
CT.,
http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/Search/Attylnfo.asp
109.
Marceau et al., supranote 2, at 1090.

110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1087.
Id.
See infra App. A.

113.
See infra App. A. Forty-six states have a felony murder rule, or the functional equivalent,
as does the United States Code. Thirty-eight states classify felony murder as first degree murder or
the state equivalent of first degree murder. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1111(a) (2015); ALA. CODE § 13A6-2(c) (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a) (2015);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
636(a)(2) (2015); FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (2015); IDAHO CODE
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criticizing Colorado's laws is further suggestion of the Authors' bias and
apparent inexperience in the area of criminal law.
The Authors further criticize Colorado's law in claiming that "the
existence of 17 aggravating factors render Colorado's statute broad in the
aggregate."ll 4 The Authors do not independently verify their claim, but
rather rely upon a 1998 law review article as support for their conclusion
that "it appears that only California has more aggravating factors than
Colorado.""'5 In reality, six other states (excluding California) have as
many or more enumerated statutory aggravating factors as does Colorado.116
B. The Purpose of the Study at the Outset Was to Defeat the Death Penalty in Colorado
In scrutinizing the objectivity of those conducting a Study that relies
upon a substantial amount of subjectivity in developing its data, it is appropriate and necessary to evaluate not just the credentials and the predisposed positions of the experts but also the motivations for conducting
such a Study. Here, the defense attorneys working for convicted infant
murderer Edward Montour"'7 solicited the anti-death penalty Authors of
the article to complete the Study in an effort to defeat the imposition of
the death penalty against their client."'8 At the time the Authors agreed to
conduct the Study, they knew their work would become the foundation
for the defense team's motion to declare Colorado's death penalty unANN. § 18-4003(d) (2015); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(2) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402(a)(2), (c)
(2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(1) (2015) (first-degree murder with intent); LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:30.1(A)(2) (2015) (second degree murder, without intent); MISS. CODE ANN. 97-3-19(1)(c)
(2015); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.021(1) (2015) (second-degree murder); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5102(l)(b) (2015) (deliberate homicide); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a(l)(b)(2), (3) (2015); N.C.
GEN. STAT. 14-17(a) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.02(B), 2929.02(B)(1) (2015) (murder,
punishable by 15 years to life);OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7(B) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. §§
163.115(1)(b), 163.095 (2015) (murder, aggravated murder); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(b) (2015)
(second-degree murder); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20(c)(a)(1), 16-3-50 (2015) (felony
murder aggravating circumstance; manslaughter); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS

§ 22-16-4(2)

(2015); TENN.

CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2015); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (West. 2015); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(1), (2)(d) (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2015) (capital murder);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(l)(c) (2015); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(a) (2015); see also Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ky. 1998) ("[P]articipation in a dangerous felony may
constitute wantonly engaging in conduct creating a grave risk of death to another under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, thus permitting a conviction not only of the
dangerous felony, but also of wanton murder. Intent is not an element of wanton murder. Thus, the
conviction of robbery is unnecessary to prove the mens rea required to convict of murder. Rather, the
facts proving the element of endangerment necessary to convict of first-degree robbery may be the
same facts which prove the element of aggravated wantonness necessary to convict of wanton murder.").
114.
Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1088.

115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1088 n.91.
See infra App. B.
People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 493-94 (Colo. 2007) (describing that the Office of the

District Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District sought the imposition of the death penalty
against Montour, who bludgeoned a prison guard to death while serving a life sentence for murdering his eleven-week old daughter).
118.
See Marceau et al., supranote 2, at 1070 n. 1.
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constitutional. In fact, their work-which is nearly identical in content to
their later published article-was used by the defense attorneys for that
very purpose.1 19 The Authors acknowledge that they "are indebted" to
Montour's defense attorneys and even to "Mr. Montour," the convicted
murderer who was pending a possible death sentence at the time of the
Study.1 20

More than that, the Montour defense team limited the data which
the Authors were to consider, provided the limited date range of cases to
be included, and provided all of the case information and data relied upon by the Authors. 12 1 The Authors supplemented the list of cases they
were provided by the Montour defense team-purportedly obtained from
the Colorado Judicial Branchl 22 -with additional cases identified and
provided only by the same Montour defense team. Thus, all of the cases
considered by the Authors in their Study were identified and provided by
the Montour defense team who were working to have Colorado's death
penalty law declared unconstitutional. A fair attempt to review all homicide cases over a limited period would have included seeking supplementation or amendment of the defense-provided list by seeking input from
the Colorado District Attorneys Council, which maintains a statewide
database of cases, or from the twenty-two individual District Attorneys'
offices in Colorado.
The experts did not do this, instead they decided to rely on information provided by, and supplemented exclusively by, defense counsel
working to defeat the death penalty on behalf of their client.
The Authors claim that, through this method, they worked from "a
complete dataset of all homicides in Colorado for a 12-year period.", 2 3
C. An Incomplete and UnreliableDatasetofHomicides
The information relied upon by Montour's defense team and the
Authors to advance their theory was analyzed. 124 Specifical119.
See Justin Marceau, Wanda Foglia, & Sam Kamin, PRELIMINARY MURDER STUDY
REPORT 1 (2012) (submitted by Montour defense attorneys in their motion D-181, filed on July 18,

2012).
120.

Marceau et al., Colorado CapitalPunishment: An Empirical Study I n.4 (University of

Denver Sturm College of Law, Working Paper No. 13-08, 2013).
121.
See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1070 n. 1. The Montour defense team provided the list
of cases to be considered by the Authors and chose not to consider any murder cases filed prior to
January 1, 1999 or any murder cases concluded after December 31, 2010. See D- 181 Appendix,
supra note 100, at 17. It is noteworthy that Many Are Called claims in its introductory words that
"This Article reports the conclusions of an empirical study of every murder conviction in Colorado
between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2010," when their submission to the Montour court
states that only cases "filed and concluded" between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2010 were
considered.
122.
See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1098.

123.

Id. at 1071 n.5.

124.
See infra App. C. Subsequent to Montour's defense team filing the Study as a supplement
to their motion D-181 asking the court to declare Colorado's death penalty statute unconstitutional,
the Prosecution filed with the court a detailed analysis and critique of the Study, entitled Prosecution
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ly, each one of the defense-created "case files" included in the Study was
reviewed for accuracy and reliability. Also the database was evaluated to
determine whether the defense team had captured all of the applicable
cases for the time period examined. The analysis revealed that the Montour defense team's "database" of 1,350 cases-on which their entire
Study was premised-is fatally flawed and incomplete.
* Seventy-one additional cases were identified from the Eighteenth
Judicial District alone, that were eligible to be included, but they
were not considered. 125
* It is unknown how many additional cases from Colorado's other
twenty-one judicial districts were similarly not included or considered.
* Twenty-two cases included by the Montour defense team should
have been excluded.1 26
* Twenty-six cases were excluded but should not have been.1 27

D. Questionable Sources and Quality ofInformation
The Authors relied upon Montour's defense team of attorneys, paralegals, and interns to build "case file[s]" from which the experts (the
Authors) sought to identify statutory aggravating factors that they subjectively determined would have made the case "death eligible."' 2 8
In addition to the unreliable and incomplete database from which
the Montour defense team began, detailed analysis also reveals a disturbing lack of reliable information considered by the Montour defense team
for each case they selected for additional review by the experts, as well
as an alarming reliance upon questionable sources of incomplete information.
* Less than one-third of the reviewed case files contained an affidavit or probable cause statement-containing facts that resulted in arrest-routinely filed in every felony case in Colorado.1 29

Murder Study. Merely for consistency and analysis, the Prosecution used the Defense team's protocols to assess their claimed "complete database." The names and qualifications of those participating
in the ProsecutionMurder Study are contained in Appendix C.
125.
See D-181 (2012-11-20) Submission of Prosecution Murder Study Report at 7, People v.
Montour, 02CR782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Prosecution Study].
126.
Id. at 7.
127.
Id. at 7.
128.
See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1098-1102, 1105. Elsewhere in this Article, we discuss the inaccuracy of the "death eligible" analysis of the authors. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
129.
See Prosecution Study, supra note 125, at 20-21.
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* Eighty-nine percent contained no information-or charging document-that would have captured the prosecutor's specific charges in
130
a case.
* Sixty-six percent of the case files lacked both a charging document
and an affidavit/probable cause statement.131
* Eighty-seven percent contained no motions filed by the prosecution or defense, sentencing memos, or briefs that would have provided specific facts of the actual case.132
* Ninety-seven percent contained no orders on motions, bond paperwork, plea paperwork, copies of advisements, sentencing orders,
or other court documents that would provide specific and actual
facts.1 33
* More than twenty-five percent of the case files rely entirely upon
news articles, press releases, or other press/media document for the
"factual" documents relied upon by the Authors to determine whether
a statutory aggravator existed.1 34
* Once they culled their list of 1,350 cases, there were 215 cases in
which the Montour defense team misapplied statutory aggravating
factors, or found more aggravating factors than actually existed, resulting in an error rate of thirty-eight percent on aggravating factors
alone. 135
Most concerning is that of the 1,350 cases provided by the Montour
defense team, the Authors provided no information for 420 of the cases
(31.1% of the cases).136 Despite that significant lack of information, the
Montour defense team reached conclusions on how to classify all 420 of
those cases without a single piece of paper from any source related to the
case. Remarkably, the Montour defense team coded only
thirty-one cases
37
as "insufficient information to support a conclusion."1
E. A Flawed andMisleading Time PeriodChosenfor the Study
The database the Montour defense attorneys directed the Authors to
use is seriously flawed and unrepresentative of the death penalty in Colorado. By utilizing dates from January 1, 1999, to December 31, 2010,'

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id
Id. at 7.
Id. at 21.
D-181Appendix, supra note 100, at 6-7.
See Marceauet al., supra note 2, at 1070-71.
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the database excludes the following data from the appellate cases in just
the two years leading up to that date where the death penalty was sought:
Table 1: 1997-1998 Data Excluded by the Study
Name / Citation

Race of
Defendant

Race of
Victim(s)

Judicial
District

Outcome

Randy Canister

Black

Black (2)
Bi-racial

18t

Judge sentence
unconstitutional

People v.
Canister,
110 P.3d

(1)

380 (Colo.
2005)
White

White (3)

1st

Death sentence
reversed by Ring
v. Arizonal39

Danny Martinez

Hispanic

Hispanic

I St

Life

White

White

4th

Death sentence
reversed by Ring
v. Az.

White

White

4th

Life

-

William
Neal cited in
In re Pauller, 47 P.3d
1175 (Colo.
2002)

George
Woldt
Woldt v.
People, 64
P.3d 256
(Colo. 2003)
Lucas Salmon

-

People v.
Martinez, 22
P.3d 915
(Colo. 2001)

cited in
Woldt v.
People, 64
139.
536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002) (holding that a determination of aggravating factors had to
be determined by a jury), overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding judge sentencing constitutional). The Colorado General Assembly after the Walton decision enacted a threejudge panel to sentence in a death penalty case.
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People v.
Martinez,
970 P.2d
469 (Colo.

Hispanic

Hispanic

1st

Death sentence
reversed by Ring
v. Az.
-

P.3d 256
(Colo. 2003)
Francisco
Martinez

1998)

Thus, a brief perusal of the Pacific Reporter shows that in just those
two years prosecutors sought the death penalty against three Whites, two
Hispanics, and one African-American. Since 1980, according to the appellate reported cases, prosecutors have sought the death penalty through
trial against twelve Whites, seven African-Americans, and nine Hispan*
4140
ics.'

In just those two years, the death penalty was sought in the First,
Fourth, and Eighteenth Judicial Districts, and most of those cases were
outside of the Eighteenth Judicial District. If we go back a little farther,
another nine years to 1978, we see that prosecutors sought the death penalty in the First, Second, Fourth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth,
and Twenty-First Judicial Districts.141 The above statistics regarding race
and location would seem to be important when addressing "the risk of
arbitrariness and discrimination"'1 42 of the death penalty in Colorado, but
inexplicably, these cases are just outside the parameters of the Authors'
Study. The Montour defense team and the Authors chose the best possible dataset to get the results that they were trying to reach in an effort to
spare Montour from a death sentence, and further, to attempt to declare
Colorado's long-standing death penalty unconstitutional.
The Study likewise does not include more recent decisions where
prosecutors sought the death penalty. For instance, the decision to seek
the death penalty in the James Holmes Case (Aurora Theater Shooting
Case) involved a white male from a privileged economic and educational
background who murdered twelve people.1 4 3 This case is not included.
Also, the Authors fail to include cases where prosecutors could have
sought the death penalty-or notice was actually filed, in which the defendant agreed to plead guilty to first degree murder with a life sentence
in order to avoid a death sentence. In the Thirteenth Judicial District, a
140.
where the
141.
where the
142.

143.

See infra App. D (describing research based upon Colorado appellate reported cases
death penalty was sought).
See infra App. D (describing research based upon Colorado appellate reported cases
death penalty was sought).
See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1094.

People v. Holmes, No. 2012-CR-1522 (Arapahoe Cty. Dist. Ct. Aug. 6, 2015).
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rural jurisdiction, the district attorney made the decision to seek the death
penalty against Brendan Johnson,'" a white male, and Cassandra Rieb,1 4 5
a white female. In the Eleventh Judicial District, a rural jurisdiction, the
district attorney made the decision to seek the death penalty against
Jaacob VanWinkle,1 46 a white male.
Since 1978, there have been twenty-four verdicts in cases in which
prosecutors sought the death penalty.1 47 Of the total, eighteen where
White defendants (including five Hispanics) and six were AfricanAmerican. Nine were reversed either in the trial court or on appeal because the U.S. Supreme Court, having held that a judge could impose a
death sentence in Walton, reversed that decision in Ring.1 48
F. Additional Defense Imposed Limitations on the Cases Consideredin
the Study
The Montour defense team adopted chronological parameters that
further limited "considered" cases to those that were both filed between
January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2010, and resolved (by verdict, plea,
or dismissal) within that same period of time.1 49 In the Eighteenth Judicial District alone, twenty-five first degree murder cases filed within the
defense-selected time period were not considered solely because they
were not resolved prior to December 31, 2010."s0 It is unknown how
many additional first degree murder cases throughout Colorado the Authors excluded for similar reasons.
Having created an unreliable, inadequate, and incomplete database,
the Authors misapply to it their misunderstanding of Colorado law.

144.

People v. Johnson, No. 2014-CR-99 (Logan Cty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 12, 2015); see also Sara

Waite, Brendan Johnson Pleads Guilty to Grandmothers Murder, Will Get Life, JOURNALADVOCATE (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:01
PM), http://www.journal-advocate.com/sterling-publicrecords/ci_27698160/brendan-johnson-pleads-guilty-grandmothers-murder-will-get.

145.

People v. Rieb, No. 2014-CR-98 (Logan Cty. Dist. Ct. May 1, 2015); see also Sara Waite,

UPDATED: Rieb to Serve 80 Years in Severance Murder Case, JOURNAL-ADVOCATE (May 1, 2015,
10:41 AM), http://www.journal-advocate.com/sterling-public-records/ci_28026226/rieb-serve-80years-severance-murder-case.

146.

People v. Van Winkle, No. 2014-CR-86 (Fremont Cty. Combined Ct. Sept. 29, 2014); see

also Anastasiya Bolton, Triple-Murder Victims' Family Cries in Court, 9NEWS (Sept. 29, 2014, 6:38
PM),
http://www.9news.com/story/news/crime/2014/09/29/canon-city-triple-murder-

court/16429149/.
147.
See infra app. D.
148.
See infra app. D; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding judge
sentencing constitutional).
149.
See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1098-1104; see also D-181Appendix, supra note 100,
at 17.
150.
Prosecution Study, supranote 125, at 8; see also D-181Appendix, supra note 100, at 17.
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V. A FLAWED APPROACH-THE STUDY'S FOCUS ON ONLY ONE SIDE OF
THE "ELIGIBILITY TRIANGLE"-THE "STRAIGHT LINE" VS. COLORADO'S
COMPREHENSIVE THREE-TIERED APPROACH TO ELIGIBILITY

In an attempt to establish the lack of constitutional narrowing of
those murderers eligible for the death penalty, the Study focuses on the
breadth of the Colorado first degree murder statute, as well as what the
Authors claim to be an unduly high number of statutory aggravating factors. The Authors conclusively state: "Notably . . . Colorado's aggravating factors are also too broad to be effective at narrowing the class of
death-eligible offenders."' 5' Examination of the Authors' illustrative
examples in this area demonstrates that their objectivity is noticeably
lacking.
For instance, the Authors claim that one of Colorado's aggravating
factors, "lying in wait, from ambush, or by use of an explosive" is overbroad and overinclusive.' 52 The Colorado Supreme Court has found that
the specific statutory aggravating factor is constitutional.153 Failing to
cite to any source for their conclusion, the Authors claim that this applies
to almost any first degree murder after deliberation:
For any murderer who kills "after deliberation," it will be the rare
case in which the perpetrator did not also surprise the victim, or at
least wait for an opportune moment to kill. Thus, the lying in wait
aggravator has application in an extremely large number of murder
54
cases in Colorado.1
Here, the Study seems to suffer from what one can understatedly

call a dearth of practical experience. By contending that the absence of
"lying in wait or ambush" aggravator is rare in a first degree murder
prosecution, the Study demonstrates a misunderstanding of the nature of
first degree murder prosecutions in Colorado and, likely, any other state.
151.
Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1088.
152.
Id. at 1089 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(f) (2012)).
153.
Only People v. Dunlop, Dunlap I, 975 P.2d 723, 751-52 (Colo. 1999), discusses the
meaning of "lying in wait." The Court found that the term has "well-founded roots in common and
legal parlance." Id. at 751. The meaning of the phrase is that "the killer conceals himself and waits
for an opportune moment to act, such that he takes his victim by surprise." Id The Court quoted
from the dictionary that "ambush" means "the act of lying in wait in or of attacking by surprise from
a concealed position," and a California case for the proposition that "lying in wait" is "a waiting and
watching the victim for an opportune time to act, together with the concealment by ambush or some
other secret design to take the victim by surprise." Id. (first quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 67 (1976); then quoting People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 457 (Cal.
1991)). Dunlap I held that "lying in wait" and "ambush" are not unconstitutionally vague-"the
terms 'lying in wait' and 'ambush' have well-founded roots in common and legal parlance, and thus
the aggravator has a 'common-sense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of
understanding."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976)
(White, J., concurring)). California has also found the aggravating factor constitutional in People v.
Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 260 (Cal. 1989). The Indiana Supreme Court has also upheld the constitutionality in Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 626 (Ind. 2004), and Ingle v. State, 746 N.E.2d
927, 940-41 (Ind. 2001).
154.
Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1089.
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Indeed, our practical experience, and that of other prosecutors with
whom we have discussed this issue, shows killing from ambush, or lying
in wait, are the rare case. Very rare.
The Study is replete with oversimplifications and misapplications of
U.S. and Colorado Supreme Court precedent to the Colorado Statute.
Perhaps most telling, with the exception of failing to consider the additional layers of the eligibility phase, is the Study's failure to carefully
and comprehensively compare the Colorado Statute to statutes that have
been held to be constitutional in other states (which have only one level
of eligibility). Unfortunately, given the lack of objectivity, in many instances the Study is guilty of comparing apples to oranges.
With the understanding that there are three phases of eligibility, the
Colorado Supreme Court has stated, "We see no constitutional infirmity
in Colorado's capital sentencing scheme."'15 5 As stated above, the Study
assumes that eligibility includes only aggravating factors, a clearly
wrong assumption.1 56 The Study begins with a faulty premise: "[T]he
purpose of the study was to determine whether Colorado's statutory aggravating factors meaningfully narrow the class of death-eligible offenders."' 57 Thus the Study only considers one of the three considerations in
Colorado eligibility determination as far as narrowing is concerned. This
approach is like looking at one side of a triangle, a straight line, and arguing conclusions without considering the other two sides that support
the whole.' 58

Even though the Study finds that Colorado allows too many murderers to be eligible for the death penalty, it paradoxically and simplistically finds reasonable a claim that "a capital sentencing scheme that produces too low of a death sentence rate is unconstitutional."' 5 9 The obvious deficiency in this reasoning stems from the flawed premise of aggravating factors being the only narrowing condition precedent to a death
sentence in Colorado. The Authors then extrapolated that improper premise to the conclusion that the low number of death sentences sought and
obtained means the statutory scheme lends itself to intolerable arbitrariness. When one looks at the Colorado scheme comprehensively though,

155.

Dunlap III, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092 (Colo. 2007).

156.
The Study only mentions in passing the consideration of mitigation and weighing. See
Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1086 n.76. This passing consideration flies in the face of numerous
Colorado Supreme Court cases that hold that mitigation and weighing are essential parts of the
"eligibility determination." See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The Study ignores longstanding Colorado law. Further the Study confounds Colorado's eligibility determination by moving
mitigation and weighing from eligibility into the selection phase. See Marceau et al., supra note 2, at

1090.
157.
158.

Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1071.
See generally EDWIN A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (6th

ed. 2015).
159.

Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1082.
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it is clear that the Study is woefully incomplete, as it considers no practical application of the eligibility criteria.
That the Study finds supportive language from Furman v. Georgia
regarding the arbitrary application of the death penalty is not surprising,
as the Furman court was dealing with an unconstitutional statutory
scheme in Georgia that is incomparable to Colorado's scheme.1 60 The
Study uses language from this decades old, fact-specific opinion and
applies it broadly to the Colorado Statute-a statute which provides more
protection than the Georgia statute that was enacted post-Furman and
found to be constitutional by the same U.S. Supreme Court in Gregg v.
Georgia:
The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were
being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the
procedures before the Court in that case, sentencing authorities were
not directed to give attention to the nature or circumstances of the
crime committed or to the character or record of the defendant. Left
unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only
be called freakish. The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the
crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory
aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this
way the jury's discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly
and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed
by the legislative guidelines. In addition, the review function of the
Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any
significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here. 161
Relying on the reasoning in Gregg, it is overwhelmingly clear that
the Colorado Statute constitutionally narrows the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty, as the Georgia statute that the Gregg court
found constitutional cannot possibly be said to narrow more than the
Colorado Statute.
The Study reaches an absolutely unsupportable position that
"[t]hese numbers [despite the low amount of cases on which sought and
obtained] compel the conclusion that Colorado's capital sentencing system fails to satisfy the constitutional imperative of creating clear statutory standards for distinguishing between the few who are executed and the
many who commit murder." 62 The Study does not include any analysis
whatsoever concerning the jury's consideration of mitigation and weigh-

160.
161.

See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).

162.

Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1072.
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ing of mitigation against aggravation. The Study overlooks the likely
cause and effect of Colorado's more stringent set of eligibility safeguards
and appropriate prosecutorial discretion accounting for the relatively low
percentage of death sentences sought or obtained. Where the Study only
considers one of three stages that are required for eligibility in Colorado,
it is impossible to say that the statute is unconstitutional. Again, it is like
describing a straight line, while not describing the triangle which is Colorado's eligibility criteria.

Table 2
Whether Mitigating
Factors Outweigh
Aggravating Factors

Mitigating
Factors

Statutory Aggravating Factors
THE COLORADO ELIGIBILITY TRIANGLE
versus
THE STUDY'S STRAIGHT LINE

Statutory Aggravating Factors

In support of the Study, one might argue that only the statutory aggravators should be considered toward constitutional narrowing, as it is
aggravators that are objectively measurable and not subject to juror discretion. This position would also be symptomatic of flawed reasoning.
The Study, quoting not from the per curiam decision but to a concurring
opinion from the Furman1 6 3 decision, conflates the U.S. Supreme Court's
163.

See Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). A paragraph per curiam opinion holding the death

penalty unconstitutional as a violation of the Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual clause, was
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"

prohibition against unfettered or "untrammeled discretion" with any, or
even guided, discretion by jurors and prosecutors alike.' 6
Fifteen years after Furman, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "Implementation of [death penalty] laws necessarily requires discretionary
judgments. Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process,
we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that
65
When an elected District Attorney in
the discretion has been abused."s
Colorado is called upon to make the decision to seek a death sentence,
that decision must be made after consideration of several factors and
after determining that the case is properly charged as first degree murder.
Those factors include, but are not limited to: (1) Are there any statutory
aggravators-and how many-that the jury is likely to unanimously find
existed beyond a reasonable doubt? (2) What statutory mitigation exists
and what "other evidence which in the court's opinion bears on the question of mitigation" 66 will or may be presented by the defense? (3) Will
the mitigation outweigh aggravation beyond a reasonable doubt?
To meet the Colorado eligibility requirement, not only must the jury
determine the aggravating factors, but it also must give those factors
weight; not only must the jury determine any mitigation, but it also must
give those factors weight; and finally, the jurors must determine whether
the weightiness of mitigation outweighs the weightiness of aggravating
factors. This three-step eligibility phase defines the "types of murders"
eligible for the death penalty in Colorado.
The Authors argue that this is not constitutional narrowing at all.
The Authors dismiss the notion that four separate district court judges
and the Colorado Supreme Court have adopted this view of narrowing in
Colorado.1 6 7 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that narrowing in
Colorado consists of statutory aggravating factors, mitigation, and the
decision whether mitigation outweighs those aggravating factors.1 68 The
followed by five separate concurring opinions and four separate dissenting opinions. Justice Douglas
held the death penalty unconstitutional because it was discriminatory in practice. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Brennan held the death penalty unconstitutional because it was the product of uncontrolled arbitrary discretion that was not acceptable to contemporary society. Id. at 305
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart held that it was unconstitutional because it was "wantonly
and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White held it unconstitutional because of its infrequency. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall held that it was
unconstitutional because, most importantly, it violated the "evolving standards of decency." Id. at

329 (Marshall, J., concurring).
164.

See Marcaeu et al., supra note 2, at 1073.

165.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
166. COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(1) (2015).
167.
See, e.g., Dunlap III, 173 P.3d 1054, 1092 (Colo. 2007); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d
786, 791 (Colo. 1990); People v. Lewis, No. 2012-CR-4743 (Den. Dist. Ct. Aug. 27, 2015) (presided
over by J. Madden); People v. Holmes, No. 2012-CR-1522 (Arapahoe Cty. Dist. Ct. Aug. 6, 2015)
(presided over by J. Samour); People v. Johnson, No. 2014-CR-99 (Logan Cty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 12,
2015) (presided over by J. Singer); People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct.
May 2, 2013) (presided over by J. Caschette).
168.
See, e.g., Dunlap III, 173 P.3d at 1092; Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 791.
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Authors' articles and arguments have been presented to all three of these
trial court judges, who then unanimously rejected the Authors' view of
narrowing.1 69 For the Authors to be correct, the Colorado Supreme Court
and three separate district court judges must be wrong.'70
VI. EVEN IF ONE WERE TO ADOPT THE REJECTED AND UNDULY
RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF COLORADO LAW PROPOSED BY THE
AUTHORS THAT ASSUMES ELIGIBILITY IS DETERMINED ONLY BY
LOOKING AT THE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS, COLORADO'S
STATUTE IS STILL CONSTITUTIONAL

What is the purpose of narrowing the class of murderers eligible for
the death penalty? In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme
Court found Georgia's death penalty statute unconstitutional.1'7 Furman
harkens one back to the early days of the Republic, when U.S. Supreme
Court Justices were expected to provide their opinions seriatim, as the
five justices in the opinions concurring with the per curiam decision
wrote five separate opinions, and the four dissenting justices filed separate dissenting opinions. 17 2 The key similarity among the Justices in the
majority was the position that Georgia applied the death penalty arbitrarily under the current statute.1 73 Under the Georgia and Texas state statutes
at issue in Furman, jurors could consider any factor, once there was a
first degree murder conviction, to impose the death penalty. 74 In re
sponse to Furman, a number of states, including Georgia, amended their
death penalty statutes, and in a series of opinions in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court found that these statutes, which included additional specific
limitations and required specific additional findings, were constitutional. 175 The thing that made the death penalty constitutional in the eyes of
the U.S. Supreme Court was this series of legislative amendments, which
switched the death penalty procedure from what Furman would have
described as a completely arbitrary system of imposing the death penalty
to one that had specific procedures and limited what the jury could consider in deciding that the death penalty was the appropriate punishment.
Most states adopted a model where the jury would weigh aggravating
factors against mitigation.' 76 Colorado added a fourth step, and instead of
a simple model where the jury would weigh aggravating factors in miti169.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
170.
Of course, the Colorado Supreme Court has no quality of supernatural perfection in its
legal pronouncements, but its status as Colorado's highest court makes its pronouncements regarding
Colorado law dispositive. One is reminded of the oft-quoted phrase from Justice Robert H. Jackson
regarding the U.S. Supreme Court, "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible

only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
171.
Furman v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
172.
See id. at 240.
173.
See id. at 242-371; see also supra note 163.
174.
See, e.g., Furman,408 U.S. at 240.
175.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 259 (1976).
176.
See infra App. F.
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gation, the Colorado General Assembly added an additional step to protect the defendant-selection of the appropriate penalty. 177
The Colorado statutory eligibility process constitutionally narrows
what the jurors may consider in deciding whether death is the appropriate
punishment. During their determination as to whether the defendant is
even eligible for the death penalty, the jurors must only focus on those
aggravating factors as limited by the General Assembly and that have
been unanimously proven to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the same time that limitations were placed on what a jury could
consider in favor of a death sentence (i.e., statutory aggravating factors)
there was an expansion of what a jury could consider in favor of a life
sentence (i.e., mitigating circumstances). The Colorado Statute strictly
limits the aggravating factors that the jury can consider.178 In the Theater
Shooting Case, we alleged five statutory aggravating factors, and the jury
found that we proved four beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, there
is no limitation on what the defendant can present as mitigating circumstances so long as the judge finds that those circumstances are relevant to
mitigation. 179 "All admissible evidence presented by . . . the defendant
that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime, and the character, background, and history of the defendant . .. may be presented." 80
No matter the number of statutory aggravating factors, those aggravating factors serve the purpose of limiting what a juror can consider
against the defendant. There has never been a case in Colorado where all
of the statutory aggravating factors have been found to exist or were even
charged. In the reported appellate cases in which prosecutors sought the
death penalty, there were as few as two and as many as six aggravating
factors. 81

177.

See People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 840-41, 846-47 (Colo. 1991) (holding unconstitu-

tional under the Colorado Constitution a procedure that eliminated the fourth step); People v. Tenne-

son, 788 P.2d 786, 788-89 (Colo. 1990) (holding constitutional the four-step procedure). The General Assembly then reenacted the prior, i.e. Tenneson, statute containing the four steps.

178.
son, 788
179.
180.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(5) (2015); see also Dunlap III, 173 P.3d at 1092; TenneP.2d at 791.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (1)(b), (4)(1).
Id. § 18-1.3-1201 (1)(b).

181.
For example, People v. White is an example of a case with two aggravating factors (prior
violent felony and heinous, cruel, or depraved)-one of which the Colorado Supreme Court found to
be in considering in error, although a harmless error-was sufficient. However, the death sentence
after being affirmed was vacated because the sentence was imposed by a judge. See People v. White,

870 P.2d 424, 436, 450-51 (Colo. 1994). People v. Petrosky is an example of a case with seven
aggravators, including intentional killing of peace officer, lying in wait, felony murder-intentional
killing, grave risk harm to another, avoid or prevent arrest or prosecution, and killing two or more
people in the same incident. See People's Notice of Statutory Aggravators (DAO15), People v. Petro-

sky, No. 95CR 1171 (Jefferson Cty. Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 1995). Defendant Petrosky was found guilty,
but after the verdict, he committed suicide. Convicted Colorado MurdererKills Self, UNITED PRESS
INT'L (May 8, 1996), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1996/05/08/Convicted-Colorado-murderer-kills-

self/3508831528000/.
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Of course, the Authors are not the first to argue that the presence of
too many statutory aggravating factors renders a death penalty statute
unconstitutional. When the Delaware Supreme Court was faced with an
argument that there were too many statutory aggravating factors in Delaware (twenty-two), the court rejected the argument because the defendant did not argue (1) that every aggravator applied to every defendant or
were unconstitutionally vague, or (2) that the aggravators in his case
were constitutionally infirm. 18 2 The defendant had failed to demonstrate
how the number of statutory aggravating factors made "his own sentence
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid."l83 In fact, there are states that have
numerous statutory aggravating factors.184 In another Delaware Supreme
Court case, the court said that the question was never "whether, taken in
combination, Delaware's statutory aggravating circumstances apply to
virtually all defendants convicted of first degree murder."1
In Illinois, the Supreme Court held that each aggravator narrowed
the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty and asked: "Even
assuming that a death penalty statute could have 'too many' aggravating
factors rendering a first degree murder defendant eligible for the death
penalty, how many aggravating factors are 'too many'?[sic]."l86 The
question has never been answered by any court, at least in a way that
would agree with the argument of the Authors.
In Jones v. United States,187 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[i]n
order for a capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional muster, it
must perform a narrowingfunction with respect to the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty and must also ensure that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualizedinquiry."188 The U.S. Supreme
Court has never held that the exclusive method of narrowing the class of
death-eligible defendants was by limiting the number of statutory aggravating factors.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that:
When the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment
182.

See Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 636, 640 (Del. 1998). The Authors' Study does not

cite to this Delaware case or statute where there are twenty-two aggravating factors. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. I1, § 4209(e) (2015) (listing twenty-two aggravating factors). One must question the scholarship that ignores pertinent citations that disfavor the Authors' position.

183.

Stevenson, 709 A.2d at 636.

184.
See SNELL, supra note 62, at 5. For example, the following states have numerous aggravating factors: Alabama has eighteen; Arizona has fourteen; Nevada has fifteen; Pennsylvania has
eighteen; Tennessee has sixteen; and Virginia has fifteen. Id.

185.
186.
187.
188.

Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 12-13 (Del. 1998).
People v. Ballard, 794 N.E.2d 788, 817-18 (Ill. 2002).
527 U.S. 373 (1999).
Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
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from those who do not, the circumstance must provide a principled
basis for doing so. If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the
death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm.
The U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Arave v. Creech190 is instructive
on eligibility. In that case, the Idaho statute at issue had a statutory aggravating factor of "utter disregard for human life" defined as being
"cold-blooded [and] pitiless."' The Court examined that factor to determine whether the state appropriately "channel[ed] the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed
guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death."l92 The court found that (1) murderers eligible for
capital punishment was broadly defined to include all first degree murderers, and (2) that a sizable class was eligible for the death penalty. The
Court stated that a "pitiless" murder might include every first degree
murderer, but that not all murders are "cold-blooded" and that there must
be some within the broad class who do exhibit feeling.' 9 3 The Court
found that because "some" might exhibit feeling, "it has narrowed in a
meaningful way the category of defendants upon whom capital punishment may be imposed." 94
A. Court Rejects the Study Authors' Opinions and Conclusions
The Montour defense team adopted the Authors' Study and legal
arguments about the claimed unconstitutionality of Colorado's death
penalty statute and incorporated them into a pleading filed with the trial
court.195 The Montour defense team and the Authors, consistent with

their article, Many Are Called, argued that eligibility for the death penalty derived exclusively from the claimed existence of a statutory aggravating factor.' 9 6 The Study and the Authors' legal conclusions are entirely
based on this premise.
The trial court disagreed. The trial court found-consistent with
Colorado statutory construction-that "the finding of a statutory aggravating factor, standing alone, is not sufficient to render a defendant eligible for the death penalty." 9 7 In rejecting the Authors' legal conclusions,

189.

Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993).

190.

507 U.S. 463 (1993).

191.
Id. at 465 (first quoting IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g)(6) (1987); then quoting Creech v.
Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 884 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd in part by Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993)).
192.
Id. at 471 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990)).
193.
Id. at 475-76.
194.
Id. at 476.
195.
See D-181 (2012-07-11) Submission of Murder Study Report, People v. Montour, No.
2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2013). The prosecution in the Montour case stipulated
to the authors' flawed numbers for purposes of resolving the motion.

196.
197.

See id. at 8, 10.
Order at 10, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2013).
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the trial court cited People v. Montour'98 for the settled Colorado law that
"[t]he death penalty eligibility determination includes three steps: finding
aggravating factors, finding mitigating factors, and weighing aggravating
factors against mitigating factors."' 99 Ultimately, the trial court found
that the Study "does not fully capture the relationship between constitutional narrowing and the Colorado death penalty statute." 200
Thus, at least one Colorado court agrees that the Study failed to accomplish its first stated primary goal, specifically, to determine "what
percentage of first-degree murderers in Colorado were eligible for the
death penalty." 201
VI. CLAIMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Having failed to convince the court that Colorado's death penalty
was unconstitutional by design, the Authors then shifted their focus to
attacking prosecutors for their use of the death penalty.
In their follow-up article, Disquieting Discretion, Professors Marceau and Kamin 20 2 use the exact same flawed and biased research in the
Study from the Montour case203 to support the additional and outrageous
suggestion that the application of the death penalty in Colorado is the
product of racism. 2 04 The Authors claim that "prosecutors in Colorado
were more likely to seek the death penalty against minority defendants
than against white defendants." 20 5
The reliance the Authors put on their prior Study is undeniable, and
given its judicial rejection, inexplicable. 2 06 Of the eighty-five footnotes in
Disquieting Discretion, forty reference the Authors' Study, their article
based upon the Study, or their mathematical computations using the
Study's claimed "complete dataset." 20 7 The entire basis for the legal conclusions advanced by the Authors in their recent article is premised on
complete reliance and faith in the accuracy and integrity of their Study. If
the Study is incomplete and inaccurate, as explained and demonstrated

198.
199.
200.

157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007).
Id. at 492.
Order at I1, People v. Montour, No. 2002-CR-782 (Douglas Cty. Dist. Ct. May 2, 2013).

201.

Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1071.

202.

Also joining the professors are Meg Beardsley and Scott Phillips, who-like Professors

Marceau and Kamin-have no experience in the practice of criminal law and procedure in Colorado,
nor are they licensed to practice law in Colorado.
203.
Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 442-43.
204.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
205.
Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 431. Likewise, the authors proclaim "the death penalty
charging decisions being made by Colorado prosecutors have a strong racially disparate impact." Id.

at 436.
206.
The Authors restate their previously rejected position that "nearly every murderer in
Colorado could have been charged with first degree murder and that nearly every first degree murderer could have been sentenced to death." Id at 439.

207.

See, e.g., id. at 442 n.57.
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previously, the remainder of the Authors' analysis and conclusions are
suspect and, arguably, unreliable.
Rather than correct the errors and shortcomings of the Study as described above, the Authors attempt instead to invent and define the term
"statutorily death-eligible [as] . . . murders for which the death penalty
was permitted as a matter of law under the Colorado first-degree murder
,,208
As demonstrated earlier, the existence of a
and death penalty statutes.
statutory aggravator alone does not permit the imposition of the death
penalty "as a matter of law," as claimed by the Authors.
Aside from the Authors' ongoing misunderstanding of Colorado's
death penalty, for the numerous reasons stated earlier in this Article, the
Study cannot be relied upon for accuracy or completeness.
The Authors attempt to justify their adoption of the Montour defense team's dictated and unrepresentative period of 1999-2010, by stating, "Our work picks up where the Radalet studies left off." 209 Professor
Michael L. Radalet, also a well-known opponent of the death penalty, cowrote an article for which a secondary goal was "to compare cases in
which the death penalty was sought with all homicides that occurred in
Colorado during the twenty-year period from January 1, 1980 through
December 31, 1999,"2 10 The Authors' Study did not attempt to further
objectively measure "cases in which the death penalty was sought" since
1999, but rather use the subjectively determined cases in which the death
penalty could have been sought 211 in their questionably expert and subjective opinion. Another distinction between the studies is that Radalet's
was focused "primarily on victim attributes," not the race of the murderer. The Study only faintly "picks up" 2 12 where the Radalet studies left
off.2 13

As with their first scholarly endeavor involving Colorado's death
penalty, the Authors again exhibit bias in their analysis and argument.
Take, for example, the manner in which they presented information in
their article. Immediately after a paragraph containing a statement for
which District Attorney Brauchler is referenced by name-not in a footnote, but in the body of the article, the Authors then write: "At the same
legislative hearing, some attempted to excuse the racially disparate operation of Colorado's death penalty by noting that non-whites commit

208.

Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 438.

209.

Id.

210.
211.
212.
213.

Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 552 (emphasis added).
Marceau et al., supra note 2, at 1096-99.
Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 438.
Hindson et al., supra note 17, at 552.
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as a result, 'African
more of the violent crime in our state and that,
214
American[s] tend to be just easier to convict."'
The sentence immediately following that one quotes by name Dan
May, the District Attorney from the Fourth Judicial District, not in a
footnote, but again in the body of the article.215 Neither individual whose
names bookend that ridiculous statement made that statement. Yet, without further information, the reader could conclude that this was part of
the testimony of prosecutors or some in favor of maintaining the death
penalty statute. Only in the footnotes do the Authors reveal that the hyperbolic and outrageous quote was made by State Representative Jovan
Melton, who happens to be both African-American and the sponsor of a
bill that would have repealed the death penalty. 2 16 Clearly, Representative Melton was not attempting to "excuse" anything about the death
penalty in Colorado. The Authors intentionally mislead the reader about
the nature of the quote cited in the body of their article.
Additionally, the Authors quote a portion of District Attorney Brauchler's statements to the Colorado General Assembly House Judiciary
Committee, "It's false to say that every first degree murder case could
arguably be the death penalty

. . . .

In fact, it requires more than the ex-

istence of an aggravating factor . . . 217 The Authors then mischaracterize this statement as a recognition and concession that "the death penalty
was frequently available but rarely used .

.

. [and that] there was a great

disparity between those eligible for the [death] penalty and those who
receive it ...

218

The Authors state, "[I]t is beyond the scope of this Article to identify or isolate the causes of this disparity . . the existence of such disparity is undeniable." 2 19 The Authors continue-in yet another footnote"that such disparities might be the result of implicit biases as opposed to
explicit showings of racial discrimination." 220 The Authors thus conclude
that the disparity they claim exists is the product of either explicit or implicit racial bias on the part of prosecutors. We deny the existence of the
massive disparity they claim exists. Their claims are unsupported by
their Study, as well as by the actual cases prosecuted in Colorado since

214.

Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 440 (alteration in original) (quoting Proposal of Repeal

of the Death Penalty: Hearing on H.B. 13-1264 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 69th
Reg. Sess. 302 (Colo. 2013) (statement of Rep. Jovan Melton)).

Id.
215.
216. See Concerning the Repeal of the Death Penalty by the General Assembly, H.B. 13-1264,
69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013).
217.

Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 440 (quoting Proposal of Repeal of the Death Penalty:

Hearing on H.B. 13-1264 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 2013 Leg., 69th Reg. Sess. 302 (Colo.
2013) (statement of George Brauchler, Dist. Att'y, 18th Judicial District)).

218.
219.
220.

Id. at 440.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443 n.62.
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1978-not just in the narrow period selected by the Montour defense
team.
The Authors claim that their article "examines the results of the
broad discretion afforded prosecutors under Colorado's capital statute."221 However, the Study does not include any analysis of cases in
which prosecutors filed the required notice of their intention to seek the
death penalty but later resolved the case through a plea short of trial. This
obvious exercise of discretion is unexplored by the Authors and unaddressed by their Study. Instead, the Authors backhandedly imply racial
bias based on supposition, innuendo, and as is readily apparent to even a
casual observer, a hard-core anti-death penalty ideology, to wit: "The
disparities found at the intersection of place and race suggest that prosecutorial discretion is not a reliable force for ensuring the even-handed
administration of the death penalty in Colorado." 222
The Authors rely upon their expert review of an unreliable and
skewed database to attempt to statistically discern in which cases the
death penalty could have been sought, as well as the subsequently extrapolated motivations of prosecutors to seek-or not to seek-the death
penalty. That methodology is wrought with subjectivity and speculation.
When those who are applying their subjective analysis are unlicensed to
practice law in Colorado, unfamiliar with Colorado law, and have never
prosecuted, defended, or litigated a single criminal case in Colorado,
scrutiny is the order of the day.
The anti-death penalty faction suggests that the death penalty is racially biased, as are the prosecutors who have sought death, by focusing
only on the racial composition of the current death row. Objectively, it is
true that all three defendants currently on death row in Colorado are African-American, yet the anti-death penalty crew do not address the five
death penalty convictions (two whites, two Hispanics, and one African
American) which occurred between Dunlap and Owens/Ray; each of
those convictions was overturned as a result of Ring v. Arizona and Walton v. Arizona.223

A more relevant and objective measure is a review of all Colorado
cases in which a death sentence was rendered since 1975. The entire list
of those cases is found at Appendix D. From that objective list of twentytwo death penalty convictions, there are several important observations
that can be made.
* The last three murderers sentenced to death were from the Eighteenth Judicial District (Montour, Owens, and Ray). Although all
three murderers are minorities (one Hispanic and two African Ameri221.
222.
223.

Id. at 441.
Id. at 445.
See infra App. D.

DENVER LAW REVIEW

674

[Vol. 93:3

cans, respectively), all three murder victims were minorities as well
(one Hispanic and two African Americans, respectively).
* Prior to the death sentence imposed in the Fourth Judicial District
by an El Paso County jury in mass murderer Nathan Dunlap's 1993
case, the Eighteenth Judicial District had only one killer sentenced to
death, a white man in 1980.
* Twenty percent of the death penalty convictions (one case) were
against Hispanics, specifically Frank Rodriguez, and it is worth noting that this death sentence was sought and obtained by the AfricanAmerican District Attorney of Denver, Norm Early (who also unsuccessfully sought death against Frank Rodriguez's brother and codefendant, Chris Rodriguez).224
* The death penalty convictions have been rendered against eighteen
whites (including five Hispanics) and five African-Americans.

Considering those numbers, African-Americans have received
22.7% of the verdicts, far more than the 4.5% of the total Colorado popu225

lation they comprise.
However, the accurate comparison is between
the percentage of convicted murderers and those murderers receiving

death verdicts. 17.6% of convicted Colorado murderers are AfricanAmerican.226 Given the small number of total death penalty convictions

since 1975 (twenty-four) and the number of death penalty convictions
against African-Americans, the 4.9% difference between 22.7% and
17.6% is the result of a single case. If there was only one less AfricanAmerican sentenced to death, the difference between the percentage of
murders and the percentage of murderers sentenced to death drops to

0.5%.
The same goes for national statistics. The right comparison should
be percentages of those on death row versus percentages of murderers as
a whole. FBI statistics indicate that nationally in 2014 there were 5,472
murders where the race was either white or black.227 White murderers
numbered 3,021 .228 African-American murderers numbered 2,45 1.229

224.
See infra App. D; see also Steve Jackson, Murderer's Row, WESTWORD (June 7, 2001,
4:00 AM), http://www.westword.com/news/murderers-row-5067064.
225.
QuickFacts:
Colorado,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/08000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2016); see also infra App. D.
226.
2014
Supplemental
Homicide
Report,
CRIME
IN
COLORADO
2014,
http://crimeinco.cbi.state.co.us/cic2kl4/suppleinentalreports/homicide.html
(last visited Jan. 30,

2016).
227.
2014
Crime
in
the
United
States,
FED.
BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-

2014/tables/expanded-homicidedata/expandedhomicidedatatable_6_murderrace

er_2014.xis (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
228.
Id.
229.
Id.

andsexofvicitm by raceandsexof offend
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Thus, although African-Americans make up only 13.2% of the population,230 almost 40% of the murders are committed by AfricanAmericans.23 1 In Colorado, a comparison cannot be made as to Hispanic
murderers or victims because neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) nor the Colorado Bureau of Investigations (CBI) kept statistics
concerning Hispanics. The FBI only recently began keeping a breakout
statistic concerning Hispanic murderers and victims. The CBI has yet to
keep Hispanic breakouts.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of racial disparity in
capital punishment in McCleskey v. Kemp.232 There, the defense argued
that the Georgia death penalty was more often imposed on AfricanAmerican defendants and killers of white victims than on white defendants and killers of African-American victims. The court held that the
statistical Study failed to establish any discriminatory purpose by prosecutors in the McCleskey case. The Court reasoned that the Study, at most,
indicated a correlation and not a causation and, thus, did not establish a
233
constitutional violation.
Given the relative infrequency with which Colorado prosecutors
have sought and obtained the death penalty since 1975, the Authors
could have reviewed each of the death penalty convictions rendered
against African-Americans to assess-in their expert opinions-whether
the case warranted pursuit of the death penalty. For example, three of the
five African-Americans and one of the Hispanics who have been sentenced to death since 1975-including all three current members of death
row-were prosecuted by the District Attorney's Office in the Eighteenth Judicial District.234
Nathan Dunlap: A remorseless mass murderer who murdered four,
while trying to murder five, by shooting each helpless victim in the
head at a Chuck E. Cheese's family restaurant. 235
Robert Ray: Just prior to his trial on murder, Ray conspired with Sir
Mario Owens to murder an eyewitness to the first murder and his fianc6, both African-Americans. 236
230.

QuickFacts:

USA,

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html

U.S.

CENSUS

(last visited Jan. 31, 2016);

BUREAU,

U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION
AND
HOUSING
(2000),
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
231.
Crime
in
the
United
States
2011,
FED.
BUREAU
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/201 I/crime-in-the-u.s.-20 11/tables/expanded-

homicide-data-table-3 (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). In 2011, there were 4,729 white, 5,486 black, 256
"other," and 4,077 unknown murder offenders.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
See id. at 314-19.
See infra App. D.
Dunlap 1, 975 P.2d 723, 733-34 (Colo. 1999).
People v. Ray, 252 P.3d 1042, 1044-45 (Colo. 2011).
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Sir Mario Owens: The double murderer of the eyewitness and Robert Ray's fianc6 in the Ray case.237
Edward Montour: While serving a life sentence for murdering his
eleven-week-old daughter, Montour used an industrial-sized heavy
metal soup ladle to crush the skull of an unsuspecting prison guard,
238
who was Hispanic.

The Authors do not attempt to explain the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to seek death against a mass murderer, joint murderers of an
eyewitness and his fianc6, or a convicted baby killer who then murdered
a prison guard as the product of racial discrimination.
Subsequent to those cases, the same Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office (with a new District Attorney as of January 2013) exercised the prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty for the mass
murderer from the Theater Shooting Case. In that 2012 case, a highly
educated white man from a privileged background murdered twelve and
injured seventy others, while trying to murder a movie theater full of
people, after booby-trapping his apartment with explosive and incendiary
devices. Those facts support the pursuit of the death penalty regardless of
the race of the mass murderer. Although we were not involved in the
prosecution, we have no doubt that the Fero's Bar murders in Denver,

resulting in five people stabbed to death and then set on fire, would have
been treated as a death penalty case by any Colorado District Attorney
(except perhaps by a District Attorney morally opposed to the death penalty) regardless of race. 2 39 There, the defendant happened to be AfricanAmerican.

The Authors completely omit any consideration of these cases in
their analysis.
A. Geography
The Authors state, "If prosecutors were, in fact, using their discretion to prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, one would
... expect that neither race nor geography would be statistically relevant
predictors of whether a death sentence is sought." 240 In suggesting that
geography matters in the determination of when to seek the imposition of
the death penalty, the Authors attempt to suggest that there is an ulterior

motive, even a sinister one: racial bias on behalf of the prosecutors. The
Authors presuppose, in part, that the decision to seek the death penalty is
unaffected by factors such as available resources and impact on the District Attorney office responsible for prosecuting a case. Of course, any237.
238.
239.

See id.
See People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 491 (Colo. 2007).
People v. Dexter Lewis, No. 2012-CR-4743 (Denver Cty. Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2015).

240.

Beardsley et al., supra note 3, at 441 (emphasis added).
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one familiar with the vast differences between Colorado's twenty-two
judicial districts knows otherwise.
The Authors began their Study with data collected from a purposedriven source: the Montour defense team. They used that questionable
data having already concluded there was a bogeyman: racial discrimination, and the prosecutors in the Eighteenth Judicial District are the biggest offenders. It is no coincidence that the Authors focus their conclusions of racism on the Eighteenth Judicial District, the judicial district in
which the only current members of death row were sentenced.
The suggestion of racism or racial bias, whether explicit or implicit
in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is offensive and unsupported
by the facts-all of them, not just the handpicked ones used by the Montour defense team and the anti-death penalty Authors.
As has been highlighted and critiqued previously, the Authors'
questionable reliance upon the date range 1999-2010, a period specifically picked by the Montour defense team, lends itself to a false representation of death penalty prosecution in Colorado.
A fair presentation of the death penalty across the twenty-two judicial districts in Colorado would be more comprehensive. The list of Colorado jurisdictions in which death penalty cases have been prosecuted
since 1978, the year the death penalty was reinstituted postFurman/Gregg, is extensive and covers the entire state. Since 1978,
prosecutors have sought the death penalty in the First, Second, Fourth,
Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-First Judicial Districts. 24 1

It is fair to explore any possible trend that the death penalty is more
likely to be sought in Denver-metro area offices. Yet, in concluding that
the answer is "racial discrimination or bias" and working backwards with
flawed data, the Authors-who combined have zero capital punishment
trial experience (Professor Marceau appears to have had two years in the
habeas corpus world in the Federal system in another state), as either
prosecutors or defense counsel-fail to consider any race-neutral, but
common-sense and practical explanations. The answer is not the explicit
or implicit racism claimed by the biased interpretations of flawed data.
The answer is money.
It is a matter of common sense that pursuing the death penalty, even
under a death penalty statute that is not the most demanding in the United States, requires more resources from a prosecutor's office than a noncapital murder case. One of the most significant costs to capital litigation

241.
See infra App. D (describing cases based upon the appellate reported cases where the
death penalty was sought).
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is the delay associated with getting the cases to trial. That delay is growing.
VII. DELAY
"[F]or more than 160 years [in the United States], capital sentences
were carried out in an average of two years or less" from the date of sentencing. 242 But by 2014, it took an average of eighteen years to carry out
a death sentence.243 In the meantime, there has been a "proliferation of
labyrinthine restrictions on capital punishment, promulgated by [the U.S.
Supreme] Court under an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that
empowered it to divine 'the evolving
standards of decency that mark the
2
progress of a maturing society."' 44
The observation that capital litigation takes a long time is not of recent vintage. In 1983 the Supreme Court noted in Sullivan v. Wainwright:
This case has been in litigation for a full decade, with repetitive and
careful reviews by both state and federal courts, and by this Court.
There must come an end to the process of consideration and reconsideration. We recognize, of course, as do state and other federal
courts, that the death sentence is qualitatively different from all other
sentences, and therefore special care is exercised in judicial re-245

view.24
When confronted with the assertion that lengthy post-conviction litigation raised by the defense means that the ultimate punishment is cruel
or unusual, or violates some other constitutional provision, the courts
have uniformly disagreed.246
Daniel Edwards, an experienced capital litigator in Colorado, has
made these observations:
A large portion of the delay in death penalty cases is directly attributable to defense attorneys. A former chief deputy public defender has
spread the word in Colorado and throughout the United States that
there are only two rules that apply to defense attorneys in death penalty litigation: "Prison Rules," and "Vegas Rules." Prison Rules mean
that when it comes to defense attorneys in capital litigation, there are
no rules. Defense attorneys are encouraged to play dumb and not follow the rules until and unless the attorney is threatened with serious
penalties. Vegas Rules mean that if you are going to go, go big.

242.
243.
244.
245.

Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
Id. at 112.

246.
Daniel Edwards, The Reality of Evolving Standards and the Death Penalty: Part II,
PROSECUTOR, April- June 2014, at 22, 39.
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Further, a chief deputy public defender indicated in the early 1980s
that the way that the death penalty was going to be defeated in Colorado
was to create the greatest possible expenditure of governmental money,
time, and resources. The objective, therefore, was to build delay. Defense
attorneys in Colorado are facile at building in delay.247
IX. BUDGET, NOT BIAS
The reason death penalty defendants are able to expend such significant resources in delaying and defending against Colorado's death penalty is money, specifically the unmatched growth of budgets for taxpayer-funded defense attorneys compared to the budgets of public prosecutors throughout the state.
Death penalty cases in the modern era are defended by the Office of
the State Public Defender (OSPD) and the Office of the Alternate Defense Counsel (OADC). 248 Since before 2000, the budgets of OSPD and
OADC have exploded: the OSPD budget increasing 317.4% and the
OADC budget increasing 289.8%.249 Funding for those two offices have
outpaced the growth in population, violent crime, inflation, the state
budget, and most significantly for the analysis of the death penalty, the
budgets of the District Attorneys throughout Colorado.
A. Vast Disparity in Funding
State taxpayer monies entirely fund the OSPD and OADC. That is
to say that the state legislature annually approves the expenditure of state
general funds to OSPD and OADC. OSPD funds a team specifically designated and trained to defend death penalty cases. They can-and are250
In the Theater
deployed wherever a death penalty case is pursued.
Shooting Case, OSPD even paid taxpayer monies to house the defense
team near the courthouse for the duration of the seven-month trial.
By contrast, District Attorneys' offices are funded locally. That is to
say that the county commissioners of the various counties within a judicial district each vote on the budget of their District Attorney. For example, in the Eighteenth Judicial District, the Boards of County Commissioners of Arapahoe, Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln counties each scrutinize and vote on the budget of the District Attorney; they contribute to
that budget based upon the proportion of the judicial district's population
that resides within each respective county. 2 5 1 The tax base available to
Colorado's sixty-four counties contained in twenty-two Judicial Districts
is far different than that available to the state.

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 22, 39-41.
Based on personal knowledge in death penalty litigation.
See infra App. E.
Based on the authors' personal knowledge in death penalty litigation.
See, e.g., Beacom v. Adams Cty, 657 P.2d 440,444 (Colo. 1983).
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Likewise, the level of public scrutiny to which OSPD and OADC
are subject is non-existent in comparison to the District Attorneys across
the state.252
The result is stark and unjustifiable.
The most straightforward way to assess the explosion of monies
available to taxpayer-funded defense attorneys is to compare the documented growth of their budgets with other relevant and known variables
over the same time period.
B. Population
Colorado: increased 24.5% from 2000 (4,301,261)253 to 2014
(5,355,866).254
Eighteenth Judicial District:
(490,722)255 to 2014 (962,585).256

increased

by

96%

from

2000

C. Economy
Between 2000 and 2014, the cumulative rate of inflation was
39.5%, with an average of 2.25% annually.257
D. Crime
The number of "major crimes"258 reported in 2000 decreased by

4.6% in 2013.

Malia Zimmerman, Public Defender Mum as Taxpayer Tab Mounts for Accused 'Batman'
252.
Killer James Holmes, Fox NEWS (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/02/15/publicdefender-mum-as-taxpayer-tab-mounts-for-accused-batman-killer-james.html. For example, the
public has been denied any information about how much taxpayer money was spent-even in the
aggregate-in the defense of the mass murderer in the Theater Shooting Case, the Chuck E.
Cheese's massacre case, or in the case of the assassination of a murder eyewitness and his flanc6. In
fact, the public has been denied any information about any taxpayer monies spend on any case in
which OSPD or OADC has represented the defendant.
253.
Population of Colorado, CENSUSVIEWER, http://censusviewer.com/state/CO (last visited

Jan. 31, 2016).
254.

QuickFacts:

Colorado,

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/08000.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
255.
County and Municipal Population Estimates - Parameters, COLO. DEP'T LOC. AFF.,
https://dola.colorado.gov/demog_webapps/peParameters.jsf~jsessionid=fD5ea58192a950d8109e0088

3f05 (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
256. Id.
257.
Based on consumer price index. See Consumer Price Index, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bis.gov/cpi/cpi dr.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
Using the classifications of "major crimes" as reported by the Colorado Bureau of Inves258.
tigations in 2000, which were limited to homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, and auto theft. Colorado
2000,
COLO.
Offenses,
CRIME
Major
Statewide
2000
http://crimeinco.cbi.state.co.us/cic2000/statetotals/statewide-offense.htm
(last visited Jan. 31,
2016). Since 2000, the number of classifications has increased. 2014 Colorado Reported Statewide
Crimes,
CRIME
COLO.
2014,
http://crimeinco.cbi.state.co.us/cic2k I 4/state%20totals/statewide offense.html (last visited Jan. 31,

2016).
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The number of district court criminal (felony) filings for all of Colorado in FY 25 9 2001 (36,860)260 increased by 10.97% in FY 2015
(40,903).261

The number of juvenile delinquency cases filed in FY 2001
(16,986)262 decreasedby 48.27% by FY 2015 (8,786).263
The number of misdemeanor cases filed in FY 2000 ( 7 3 , 8 5 3 )264 decreased by 15.87% in FY 2015 (62,13 1).265
E. Budgets of OSPD and OADC
Appendix E captures the annual budgets of OSPD and OADC from
2000-2015 and illustrates the following: 266
Between 2000 ($27,296,931) and 2015 ($86,639,8883), the annual
budget of OSPD increasedby 317.4%.
Between 2000 ($10,683,438) and 2015 ($37,980,369), the annual
budget of OADC increasedby 289%.

The Eighteenth Judicial District, the most populous judicial district
in the state with nearly one million residents, has a budget that permits
the District Attorney to make decisions about how to seek justice in individual cases independent of the resources available to the taxpayerfunded behemoth OSPD and OADC. Of the other judicial districts, only
the largest, the First (Jefferson), Second (Denver), and Seventeenth (Adams) have the fiscal ability to withstand the seemingly limitless resources
available to-and used by-those who represent the murderers facing the
death penalty.
F. Additional Inquiries Not Made by the Authors

It is a matter of common sense that increased population and population density may provide for a great opportunity and incidence of multiple and mass murders. Cities such as Denver, Aurora, Colorado
FY = Fiscal year. Colorado State Judicial Fiscal Year runs from July I" through June
259.
each year.
260.

COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, at

27,
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/Planningand
alReports/2001/2001`%20annual%20report.pdf.
261.

Analysis/Annual_Statistic

Id.; COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, JUDICIAL BRANCH ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL

YEAR
2015,
at
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/Planningand
alReports/2015/FY201 5%2OAnnual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf.
262.
263.

30 h

17,
Analysis/AnnualStatistic

COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 261, at 47.
Id.; JUDICIAL BRANCH ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note

262, at 43.
264.
COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 261, at 75.
265.

Id.; JUDICIAL BRANCH ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note

262, at 65.
266.
See infra App. E (containing the delineated Colorado Sessions Laws within the table).
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Springs, and Lakewood have far different societal, historic, and economic issues related to crime and violent crime rates than do Durango, Aspen, Glenwood Springs, and Lake City. Nonetheless, the Study's Authors do not address or attempt to explore this issue.
If there is any recent geographic trend regarding the pursuit of the
death penalty, although none has been reliably shown with the Authors'
unreliable data and Study, it is likely due to these non-discriminatory
explanations-and perhaps others never explored by the Authors. The
Authors, having not pursued any explanation other than their predetermined one of racial discrimination, left to hypothetical future research
the determination of whether the Colorado death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied by Colorado prosecutors.
X. CONCLUSION

Colorado should continue to assess and analyze the death penalty.
There is no more grave decision an elected prosecutor can make than to
set the machinery of government in motion to take the life of another
member of society, even one who is a heinous, depraved, and multiple
killer of the innocent. Coloradans have assessed and analyzed the death
penalty since before statehood, and Coloradans have historically and
consistently insisted on having the death penalty available as a discretionary tool of elected prosecutors. The anti-death penalty, "life for killers" group does what minority opinion groups do every time they fail to
convince the populace of the rightness of their position: they turn to the
courts to override the will of the people. In Colorado, those modern efforts to invite the judiciary to impose public policy on the majority have

failed.
To achieve their goal of lowering the bar of punishment for aggravated murderers, the Authors-at the request of a murderer attempting to
avoid the death penalty for his second murder-have applied their questionable expertise and nearly complete misunderstanding of Colorado's
death penalty laws to a biased and flawed set of data compiled by the
murderer's defense team to support a theory they had from the outset: the
Colorado law is defective and unconstitutional. That argument having
failed, they then used the exact same data to support another preconceived notion: prosecutors discriminate based on race and the worst offenders are in the Eighteenth Judicial District. The Study does not draw
any reliable conclusions about anything related to homicides or the death
penalty in Colorado.
Colorado's death penalty is the toughest in the United States to
achieve. Taxpayer-funded defense attorneys have turned a historic explosion in funding over the past fifteen years into undeniable and significant
increases in delay and cost associated with capital litigation, and in so
doing, they have priced many non-metro area jurisdictions out of the
ability to pursue the death penalty. Colorado should consider amending
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its statutes to be more consistent with those of the federal government
and the vast majority of states that have death penalty laws.
APPENDIX A

FELONY MURDER RULE SURVEY

State

Alabama

Felony-Murder
Statute

Yes CODE

Felony Murder
as First-degree
Murder
Yes

ALA.

§ 13A-6-

Yes -

ALASKA

STAT.

§

Only those

Yes -

enumeratedin

11.41.100(a)(2)(5) (2015);
ALASKA STAT.

Yes -

ALA.

CODE

§ 13A-

6-2(c) (2015)

2(a)(3) (2015)
Alaska

Capital Punishment for
Felony Murder

§

ALASKA STAT. §
11.41.100(a)(2)(5) (2015)

No - ALASKA
STAT. §
12.55.125(a)
(2015)

11.41.110(a)(3)(5) (2015)
Arizona

Yes -

§ 13-1105(A)(2)

ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 131105(A)(2)
(2015)

ANN. § 131105(D)
(2015)

Yes

Yes - ARK.
CODE ANN. §

(2015)

Arkansas

Enumer-

ated Felonies in

Yes -

ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-

Colorado

Yes - CAL.
PENAL CODE §

Yes - Only
those enumerated

Yes - CAL.
PENAL CODE

189 (West 2015)

in CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189
(West 2015)

§ 190(a)
(West 2015)

Yes -

Yes

COLO.

REV. STAT.

§ 18-

Yes

CONN.
GEN. STAT. §
-

Yes -

COLO.

REV. STAT.§

18-1.31201(1)(a)
(2015)

3-102(1)(b)
(2015)
Connecticut

ARIZ.
REV. STAT.

5-10-101(c)
(2015)

10-101(a)(1)
(2015)
California

Yes -

Yes - ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN.

No -

Felony

Murder

No

CONN.
GEN. STAT.§
-
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53a-54c (2015)
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53a-45 (2015)

Delaware

Yes- DEL.
CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 636(a)(2)
(2015)

Yes

Yes- DEL.
CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §
4209(a)
(2015)

Florida

Yes - FLA.
STAT. § 782.04
(2015)

Yes - Only
those enumerated
in FLA. STAT. §
782.04(1)(a)(2)
(2015)

Yes - FLA.
STAT. §
775.082(1)(a)
(2015)

Georgia

Yes - GA.
CODE ANN. § 165-1(c) (2015)

Yes

Yes - GA.
CODE ANN. §
16-5-1(e)(1)
(2015)

Hawaii

None

N/A

N/A

Idaho

Yes - IDAHO
CODE § 184003(d) (2015)

Yes - Only
those enumerated
in IDAHO CODE §
18-4003(d)
(2015)

Yes - IDAHO
CODE § 184004 (2015)

Illinois

Yes - 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT.
5/9-1(a) (2015)

Yes - Only forcible felonies
under 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/91(a) (2015)

Yes - Only
with presence
of aggravating
factor
720 ILL.
COMP. STAT.
5/9-1(b)
(2015)
Yes - IND.
CODE § 3550-2-3(b)
(2015)

Indiana

Yes - IND.
CODE § 35-42-11(2) (2015)

N/A

Iowa

Yes - IOWA
CODE §
707.2(1)(b)
(2015)

Yes - Only forciblefelonies
under lOWA
CODE §
707.2(1) (b)
(2015)

No - IOWA
CODE §
902.1(1)
(2015)

Kansas

Yes - KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 215402(a)(2)

Yes

No - KAN.
STAT. ANN. §
21-6620
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(2015)
Kentucky
Louisiana

(2015)

None
Yes -

N/A
Yes - Only those

LA. STAT.

ANN.

§ 30(A)(1)

enumerated in

LA. STAT. ANN. §
30(A)(1) (2015)

(2015)
Maine

Yes -

No - Felony

ME.

STAT. tit. 17-a,

§

Murder

Massachusetts

Yes -

Yes - Only those

MD.

No

-

ME.

STAT. tit. 17-a,

No

-

MD.

enumerated in
MD. CODE ANN.,

CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW §

201(a)(4) (West
2015)

CRIM. LA W § 2201(a) (4) (West
2015)

2-201(b)
(West 2015)
No - MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch.

be punishable by
life in prison -

Yes - However,
the felony must
be punishable by
life in prison -

MASS. GEN.

MASS. GEN. LAWS

Yes -

However,

LAWS ch. 265,
1 (2015)

§

Michigan

None - Abolished by case
law, People v.
Aaron, 299
N.W.2d 304
(Mich. 1980).

Minnesota

Yes -

ch. 265, § 1
(2015)
N/A

MINN.

Yes - Only those

No

§

enumerated in
MINN. STA T. §

609.185(a)(3)
(2015)

609.185(a)(3)
(2015)

Yes - MISS.
CODE ANN. § 973-19(1)(c), (2)(e)
(2015)

Yes -

265, § 2(a)
(2015)

N/A

STAT.

Missouri

§

30(C) (2015)

CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 2-

the felony must

Mississippi

Yes - LA.
STAT. ANN.

§ 1251 (2015)

202 (2015)
Maryland

N/A

Mo. REV.

STAT. §

565.021(1)(2)

Yes

Yes - Only
those enumerated in Miss.
CODE ANN. §
97-3-19(2)(e)
(2015)

No - Second

No

Degree

1
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(2015)
Montana

Yes- MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-

Yes

-

Deliberate

Homicide

5-102(1)(b)
(2015)
Nebraska

Yes -

§

Yes -

28-

303(1)(b) (2015)

Nevada

Yes -

MONT.
CODE ANN. §

45-5-102(2)
(2015)

NEB.

REV. STAT.

Yes

NEV.

REV. STAT.§

Only those

enumeratedin

NEB. REV. STA T.
28-303(1) (b)
(2015)

§

§

29-2502
(2015)

Yes - Only those

Yes - NEV.

enumeratedin

REV. STAT. §

§

200.030(1)(b)
(2015)

NEV. REV. STAT.
200.030(1)(b)
(2015)

New Hamp-

Yes - N.H.

Yes - Only those

shire

REV. STAT. ANN.

enumerated in

§ 630:1-a(I)(b)

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:1a(I)(b) (2015)

(2015); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN.

No - NEB.
REV. STAT.

200.030(4)(a)
(2015)
No

§ 630:1-b(I)
(2015)
New Jersey

Yes STAT.

N.J. REV.

No -

Yes

§ 2C: 11-

3(a)(3) (2015)
New Mexico

Yes -

2C:11-3(b)
(2015)
Yes - Called

N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 30-

CapitalFelony

2-1(A)(2) (2015)
New York

YES -N.Y.
125.25(3)
(McKinney
2015)

North Caroli-

Yes -

na

GEN. STAT.

Degree -

Yes
14-

Yes -

N.C.

14-17(a)
(2015)

N.D.

CENT. CODE

Yes -

GEN. STAT.§

17(a) (2015)
North Dakota

No

N.Y

PENAL LA W §
125.25(3)
(McKinney 2015)

N.C.

§

Yes - N.M.
STAT. ANN. §
30-2-1(A)
(2015)

No - Second

§

PENAL LAW

N.J.

REV. STAT.§

Yes

§

12.1-16-01(1)(c)

No -

N.D.

CENT. CODE

12.1-32-01(1)

§
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(2015)
Ohio

Yes -

OHIO

(2015)
No - Involun-

REV. CODE ANN.

tary Manslaugh-

§ 2903.04(A)

ter - OHIO REV.

(West 2015)

CODEANN.

No

§

2903.04(C) (West
2015)
Oklahoma

Yes - OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, §

701.7(B) (2015)

Oregon

Yes - OR. REV.
STAT. §

163.115(1)(b)
(2016)
Pennsylvania

Yes - 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. §

Yes -

Only those

Yes

-

OKLA.

enumerated in

STAT. tit. 21,

OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 701.7(B)
(2015)

§ 701.9(A)

Yes - Only those
enumerated in

No - OR.
REV. STAT. §

OR. REV. STAT.
163.115(1)(b)
(2016)

§

No - Second
Degree

2502(b) (2016)

(2015)

163.115(5)
(2016)
No - 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. §

1102(b)
(2016)

Yes - 11 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-

Yes - Only those
enumerated in 11

No - 11 R.I.
GEN. LA WS §

23-1 (2016)

R.I.GEN. LAWS §
11-23-1 (2016)

11-23-2
(2016)

South Carolina

None

N/A

N/A

South Dakota

Yes - S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-16-4(2)

Yes - Only those
enumeratedin
S.D. CODIFIED

Yes - With
Aggravating
Circumstance

(2015)

LA ws § 22-164(2) (2015)

- S.D.
CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A27A-4 (2015)

Yes - TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-

Yes - Only those
enumerated in

Yes - TENN.
CODE ANN. §

13-202(a)(2)
(2015)

TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13202(a) (2) (2015)

39-13202(c)(1)
(2015)

Rhode Island

Tennessee

Texas

Yes -

TEX.

PENAL CODE
ANN. §

Yes

Only if Intentional - TEX.
PENAL CODE
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ANN. §
19.03(a)(2),
(b) (West
2015)

19.02(b)(3)
(West 2015)

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Yes - UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-

Yes - Only those
enumeratedin

No - UTAH
CODEANN. §

5-203(2)(d)
(2015)

UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-203(1),
(3)(a) (2015)

76-5203(3)(b)
(2015)

Yes - VT.
STAT. ANN. tit.

Yes - only those
enumeratedin

No - VT.
STAT. ANN. tit.

13, § 2301
(2015)

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 2301 (2015)

13,

Yes -

Yes -

VA.

CODE ANN.

Washington

§

Wisconsin

Only those

§ 2303(a)
(2015)
No

enumeratedin

18.2-32 (2015)

VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-32 (2015)

Yes - WASH.
REV. CODE §

Yes - Only those
enumeratedin

9A.32.030(1)(c)
(2015)

West Virginia
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No - WASH.
REV. CODE §

WASH. REV.
CODE §
9A.32.030(1)(c)
(2015)

9A.32.040
(2015)

Yes - Only those
enumerated in W.

No - W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-

(2015)

VA. CODE § 61-21 (2015)

2(2015)

Yes - WIS.
STAT. § 940.03

No - Sentence
Enhancer

No

Yes - WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-

Yes - Only those
enumeratedin

Yes - WYO.
STAT. ANN. §

2-101(a) (2015)

WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-2-101 (a)
(2015)

6-2-101(b)
(2015)

Yes CODE

W. VA.
§ 61-2-1

(2015)
Wyoming
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APPENDIX B

267

NUMBERS OF AGGRAVATING FACTORS IN THIRTY-THREE DEATH
PENALTY STATES

Table A6-1 below gives the counts of statutory and specified factors
in the death penalty of thirty-three states, sorted in descending order by
the number of specific factors.
STATUTO
RY
SPECIFIC
FACTORS FACTORS

STATE

STATUTE

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202
(2015)
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30

20

98

12

62

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204
(2015)
Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.032 (2015)

17

62

17

59

§ 4209

22

56

§ 14:30 (2015)

10

55

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000
(2015)
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2015)

11

53

16

50

ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101
(2015)
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102
(1977)

10

48

12

48

Idaho
Pennsylva-

IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (2015)
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711

11
18

45
45

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201

17

44

14

41

10

39

18
1
12

38
34
30

9

29

Georgia

Tennessee
Missouri
Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,

(2015)

Louisiana
North Carolina
Indiana

LA. STAT. ANN.

Arkansas
Wyoming

(2015)
WASH. REV. CODE
(2015)

Washington

§ 10.95.020

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04
(2015)
Florida
FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2015)
California CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (2015)
South Caro- S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2015)

Ohio

_

Texas

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

(West 2015)

§ 1903

267.
This appeared as Appendix 6 to the Prosecution Murder Study filed in response to the
Montour Defense Motion D-181 in People v. Montour, 02CR782. See Prosecution Study, supra note
137, at 30-31. The research was conducted by the Staff identified in Appendix C. See infra app. C.
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§ 18.2-31 (2015)
§ 163.095 (2016)

15
12

28
27

§ 13-751

14

25

8
8_25
10

25

10

24

Virginia
Oregon

VA. CODE ANN.

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
(2015)

Mississippi

OR. REV. STAT.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19
(2015)
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (2015)

Alabama
South Dako- S.D. CODIFIED LAWS

ta
Kentucky

11

§ 23A-27A-

(2015)

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025
(et21)8
(West 2015)
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2303 (West 2016), repealed by

Maryland

2013 Laws of Maryland, c. 156
(May 2, 2013).
Montana
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303
(2015)
Nevada
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6624
Kansas
(2015)
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-303 (2015)
New Hamp- N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5
shire
(2015)
Oklahoma

[Vol. 93:3

OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,

§ 701.7

24

23

10

21

9

20

15

20

8
8
10

17

8

11

17
15

TABULATION METHODOLOGY
The goal of this appendix is to present, for comparison purposes, a
list of the number of specific aggravating factors identified in the death
penalty statutes of the thirty-three states that actually have the death penalty. Because the statutes of the states vary considerably in specificity,
each state's list of aggravating factors was converted into a standardized
form, using equivalent levels of aggregation for the specific factors.
The standard for the level of aggregation was based roughly on the
Colorado Statute, with factors (c), (e), (g), and (k) expanded into their
constituent parts. Using this standard, Colorado has seventeen enumerated factors, (a) through (q), which constitute forty-four specific factors.
This level of aggregation for specific factors was applied consistently
across all thirty-three states.
As an example of this process, a factor that distinguishes between
killing a peace officer and killing a former peace officer was listed as a
single factor. A factor that distinguishes between a prior homicide and a
prior attempted homicide was similarly listed as a single factor. On the
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other hand, a statute that lists within one paragraph the killing of a peace
officer and a fireman was broken down into two specific factors: killing a
peace officer, and killing a fireman.
APPENDIX C
STUDY PERSONNEL268 FROM MONTOUR PROSECUTION TEAM

2 69

1. Loren Cobb is an Associate Research Professor at the University
of Colorado Denver, Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences. He has been on the faculty since 2008, teaching mathematical statistics and running the department's statistical consulting service. For fifteen years prior to joining the research faculty of the University of Colorado Denver, Dr. Cobb was a consultant, primarily for the U.S. Department of Defense and secondarily for the Ministries of Defense of Sweden and the United Kingdom. He has designed and facilitated scores of
high-level international exercises in long-range national strategic planning, United Nations peacekeeping, disaster-relief operations, complex
humanitarian emergencies, and hemispheric multilateral negotiation.
Prior to this he was an Associate Professor of Biostatistics and Biomathematics in two medical schools. He has taught courses at the doctoral
level in departments of sociology, anthropology, psychology, statistics,
and mathematics. His research has been continuously funded since 1988
by a variety of agencies, including the National Science Foundation, the
National Institutes of Health, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, the U.S. Air
Force, and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the author of several dozen scientific papers, chapters, and books, and holds a patent for his analytical software algorithms. His PhD is from Cornell University, 1973, in
mathematical sociology.
2. Paul Wolff (legal expert for the Prosecution Team) received his
BA from Knox College in 1967 and his JD from the University of Colorado Law School in 1973. He served with the United States Marine
Corps from 1968-71, rising to the rank of captain. His work experience
includes seven years with the Denver District Attorney's Office (Deputy
DA, Chief Deputy DA), two years in private practice, ten years with US
West Communications (counsel, senior counsel), and two years with St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (attorney). Mr. Wolff served in

268. Other than Dr. Cobb, all Study personnel are or were licensed to practice law in Colorado,
based on information known to personnel at District Attomey's Office for the 18 1h Judicial District.
269. The report generated by the staff was a component of the Prosecution response to the
Montour Defense Team's motion D-181, regarding the Defense-titled "Colorado Death Penalty
Eligibility Study," dated 9 September 2012, referred to in this report as the Defense Murder Study.
The purpose of their response was to provide the trial court with a critical evaluation of the Defense
Murder Study, an analysis of the Defense and Prosecution databases, a quantification of the process
of narrowing death penalty eligibility in Colorado, and a brief examination of the statistical consequences of severing certain aggravating factors from the Colorado death penalty statute.
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the Colorado Attorney General's Office from 1994-2003, as First Assistant for the Capital Crimes Unit, and then served from 2003-2009 in the
Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office as Chief Appellate Deputy
DA. He retired in 2009.
3. Chris Wilcox received his JD from the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law in 2012. He has been a Deputy District Attorney
in the Eighteenth Judicial District since 2012, following nearly two years
during which he worked as a legal intern in the Economic Crimes Unit,
Arapahoe County Court, and as a researcher for the D-181 Research
Team. Chris received his B.S. in Organizational Communications in
Business and Government through the Liberal Studies program at Montana State University Billings.
Prior to law school, Mr. Wilcox worked on several large-scale, multi-source, collaborative research projects. In 2003, as an Aide to the Senate Majority Leader in the Montana Legislature, he developed and implemented a vote-tracking program, which gathered information on every
vote cast by every member of the Montana Legislature on every bill,
analyzing the effects of key legislation and reporting on voting patterns.
He also worked as the Victory Director for the Montana Republican Party (2005-2006), building and coordinating a massive voter contact operation, which gathered and analyzed millions of pieces of information on
voters, culminating in a voter-targeting program that was recognized one
of the best in the nation. Chris also worked as the Executive Director of
the Montana Republican Party (2007), which included significant research focused on legislative district targeting, and the Campaign Manager for the Roy Brown for Governor Campaign (2008), which involved
coordinating detailed county and precinct research and strategy development.
4. Kristina Lynne Hayden received her BA from Davidson College,
Charlotte, North Carolina, in 2007, and her JD from the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law in 2012. Ms. Hayden has been a Deputy
District Attorney in the Eighteenth Judicial District since 2013. She previously worked as a researcher for the D- 181 Research Team of the Colorado Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office and the Appellate
Department of the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office from
May 2010 to May 2011 as a legal intern, and as a legal intern (under the
Student Practice Act) in the Arapahoe County courts.
5. Ashley Brea Mufioz received her BA from the University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, in 2008, and her JD from the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law in 2012. Ms. Munoz has been a Deputy
District Attorney in the Eighteenth Judicial District since 2013. Previously, she worked as a researcher for the D-181 Research Team of the Colorado Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office. She previously
worked as a legal intern for the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's
Office (under the Student Practice Act) in the Arapahoe County courts.
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Ryan Stephen Robertson received his BA from the University of
Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, in 2009, and his JD from the Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, in Ada, Ohio, in 2012. Mr. Robertson has been a Deputy District Attorney in the Fourth Judicial District
since 2012. Previously, he worked as a researcher for the D-181 Research Team of the Colorado Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office. He previously worked in the Appellate Department of the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office from May 2010 to August 2011
as a legal intern, and as a legal intern (under the Student Practice Act) in
270
the Arapahoe County courts.
APPENDIX D
DEATH PENALTY SENTENCES IMPOSED IN COLORADO TRIAL COURTS

1975-2015*
Highlighted are Ring v. Arizona vacated death sentences after Walton v. Arizona.271

Year

Name

Judicial
District**

Circumstances

Race
Defendfend-

Race Victim

272

ant

White

White

Murder x
3

Black

White

4th

Kidnaprapemurder

Black

White

Kenneth
Botham

21st

Murder
wife,
neighbor,
two children (4)

White

White

Ronald

21st

Murder of
partner in

White

White
(Hispanic)

1975

Dean
Wildermuth

17th

1975

Michael
Corbett

4th

1975

Freddie
Glenn

1975

1976

270.
It should be noted that the Defense Data Collection Team was composed of unidentified
paralegals and intems working for the Montour Defense Team and unrevealed in the Many Are
Called and Disquieting Discretion.
271.
This table is intended to show those cases in which the death penalty was imposed from
1975-2015, specifying the race of both the murderer and the victim, as well as a general description
of the murder or murders. See Prosecution Study, supra note 137, at 26-43.
272.
Because the FBI and CBI did not keep a break-out of Hispanic murderers from White
murderers, all are classified as White, with a Hispanic notation in parenthesis.

DENVER LAW REVIEW

694

Ferrell
1976

Scott
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drug deals
-st

Felony-

White

Black

White

murder

-

Raymer

x2
1977

Ricky
Dillon

4th

Robberymurder

White

1980

Robert
Williams

18th

Murderconspiracy

White

1980

Edgar
Duree

2nd

Robberymurder

White

White

1981

Steven
Morin

1st

Kidnaprape murder

White
(Hispanic)

White

Johnnie

19th

Robbery-

White

White

murder -

(His-

beaten to
death
with a
hammer

panic)

Murder of

White

White

1981

Arguello

1982

Richard

21st

wife - for

Drake

life insurance
1984

Frank
Rodriguez

2nd

Kidnaprapemurder

White
(Hispanic)

White

1986

Gary
Davis

17th

Kidnaprapemurder

White

White

1987

John
O'Neill

21st

Murder of
marijuana
growing
partner

White

White
(Hispanic)

1987

Ronald
Lee
White

1st

Multiple
murder
(2)

White

White

1993

Nathan
Dunlap

18th

Multiple
murder
(4)

Black

White
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1994

Robert
Harlan

17th

Kidnaprapemurder

Black

White

1997

George
Woldt

4th

Kidnaprapemurder

White

White

1997

Francisco
Martinez

Ist

Kidnaprapemurder

White
(Hispanic)

White

1998

William
Neal

1st

Multiple
murder
(3)

White

White

2002

Edward
Montour

18th

Murder of
law enforcement;
pnor conviction
murder

White
(Hispanic)

White
(Hispanic)

2006

Sir Mario
Owens

18th

Multiple
murder

Black

Black

Black

Black

(2); prior
conviction murder; murder of
witness

Robert

Totals

24

18
White
(5 Hispanic)

1 6 Black
*Information from JBITS, Colorado DOC Inmate Locator, Colorado Appellate Decisions; ** 1st, 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 21st.
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APPENDIX E
FUNDING FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND ALTERNATE DEFENSE
COUNSEL273

(not including any supplemental appropriation)

2000-2015
Public Defenders

2000

$27,296,931

317.4%

2015

$86,639,883

Average yearly increase 8.019%
Alternate Defense

2000

$10,683,438

289.8%

2015

$30,962,991

Total

2000

$37,980,369

309.6%

2015

$117,602,874

Year

Colorado
Sessions
Laws

Public Defender

2000

Chapter
413 pp
2522-23

$27,296.931

2001

Chapter
349 pp
1727-28

$27,321,931

.09%

$10,919,838

2.21%

2002

Chapter
399 pp
2819-20

$31,313,247

14.6%

$11.973,335

9.64%

2003

Chapter

$31,956,458

2%

$11,941,766

(0.3%

273.

Compiled October 27, 2015.

Percent
increase
(decrease)
over
prior
year

Alternate
Defense
Counsel

Percent
increase
(decrease
) over
prior
year

$10,683,438
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)

449, pp
3287-88
Chapter
427, pp
2517-18

$32,593,660

1.9%

$12,443,302

4.2%

2005

Chapter
354 pp
2045-46

$34,920,760

7.1%

$13,889,280

11.6%

2006

Chapter
394 pp
2629-30

$37,171,280

6.4%

$18,291,224

31.7%

2007

Chapter
466 pp
2698-99

$44,720,097

20.3%

$21,640,265

18.3%

2008

Chapter
474 pp
2870-71

$50,893,524

13.8%

$23,227,619

7.3%

2009

Chapter
464 pp
3037-39

$54,583,854

7.25%

$23,692,141

1.99%

2010

Chapter
453 pp
2791-2792

$57,355,891

5%

$24,556,665

3.6%

2011

Chapter
335, pp
1999-2000

$61,938,317

7.98%

$23,248,059

(5.4%

2012

Chapter
305 pp
2129-30

$62,998,015

1.7%

$22,560,446

(3%)

2013

Chapter
441, pp
2981-82

$71,148,573

12.9%

$22,896,598

1.5%

2014

Chapter
420, pp
2513-14

$82,604,070

16.1%

$29,645,966

29.5%

2015

Chapter
364 pp
1924-26

$86,639,883

4.9%

$30.962,991

4.4%

)

2004
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F

PROCEDURE IN JURISDICTIONS WITH THE DEATH PENALTY

State

Phase 1- Eligi-

Phase 2 - Selection

bility
Alabama:
ALA. CODE

§§
-

13A-5-39-40, 13A5-43,13A-5-45 to
49,13A-5-51-52
(2015)

1- Aggravating circumstances: jury
must unanimously
find one aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt

2- Defendant can provide
mitigating circumstances-only need to interject
issue if factual problem
and then state must disprove beyond a preponderance; beyond that no assigned standard or burden
3- Jury weighs aggravating
circumstances (statutory)
against mitigating circumstances; if mitigating outweighs, recommend life if
majority would recommend; if aggravating outweighs, recommend death
if ten jurors vote for death

Arizona:
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-751 to

-752 (2015)

"Aggravation Phase"
*

State must prove
one or more
statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt
and trier of fact
must unanimously find that an aggravating circumstance has been

4- Judge decides life without parole or death sentence after considering all
the evidence, considering
the jury's advisory verdict,
and making a written finding of his decision. No
burden of proof is assigned
to this stage of the proceeding
"Penalty Phase"
* Mitigating circumstances must be proven by
a preponderance of the
evidence by the defendant
and the jurors do not have
to unanimously find that
these circumstances have
been proven
The trier of fact shall
impose a sentence of
death if the trier of fact
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unanimously determines that there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently
substantial to call for
leniency
2-After the presentation of
1-Jury must unaniArkansas:
evidence of aggravating
mously find that a
ARK. CODE ANN.
and mitigatcircumstances
aggravating
statutory
jury
the
(2-4-015) to-605 circumstance exists ing circumstances,
must unanimously find
beyond a reasonable
that the aggravating facdoubt but does not
tor(s) outweighs all mitiassign the burden of
gating circumstances
proof
proven beyond a
reasonable doubt

found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt but does
not assign the burden of

proof

California:
CAL. PENAL CODE

§§ 190.1-.5 (West
2015);
Jury Instruc-

tions:Califomia
Criminal Jury Instructions, Nos.
763-766

1. The jury must
unanimously determine whether one or

more of the charged
special circumstances
has been found to be
true beyond a reasonable doubt

3- Jury unanimously
agrees that aggravating
circumstances justify a
sentence of death beyond a
reasonable doubt but does
not assign the burden of
proof
2. The trier of fact shall
consider, take into account
and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances referred to
in this section
3. The jury shall impose a
sentence of death if the
trier of fact unanimously
concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. No burden
assigned to this weighing.
*

Jury instructions state:
"To return a judgment
of death, each of you
must be persuaded that
the aggravating circumstances both out-
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Colorado:
COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 18-1.3-1201
(2015)

1. Jury must find at
least one statutory
aggravating factor
unanimously and
beyond a reasonable
doubt
2. The jury must
determine whether
any mitigating factors
exist-an individual
determination without
a burden of proof

[Vol. 93:3

weigh the mitigating
circumstances and are
also so substantial in
comparison to the mitigating circumstances
that a sentence of
death is appropriate
and justified"
4. The jury must determine
the appropriate sentencelife without parole or the
death penalty. To impose
death, the verdict must be
found unanimously and
beyond d a reasonable
doubt-without the standard of proof being assigned
to a party

3.

Delaware:
DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 11, § 4209
(2015)

The jury must
determine whether mitigation
outweighs statutory aggravating
factors beyond a
reasonable doubt
and unanimously-without the
standard of proof
being assigned to
a party
1. Jury must unanimously find the existence of at least one
statutory aggravating
circumstance beyond
a reasonable doubt

2. Jury must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating
factors (statutory and nonstatutory) outweigh the
mitigating circumstances
and report to the court the
number of affirmative and
negative votes
3. The court may impose a
sentence of death if the
jury has found the existence of one statutory ag-
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Florida:
FLA. STAT.

§ 921.141 (2015)

Georgia:
GA. CODE ANN.

§§ 17-10-30, 1710-31 (2015)

Idaho:
IDAHO CODE

§ 19-

1. Jury must find that
at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
statute does not state
if this must be majority or unanimous.

1. The jury must find
that there is at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

gravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt
and the court finds by a
preponderance of evidence
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances
2. Jury must decide whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances such
that they outweigh the
statutory aggravating circumstances and then determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
without parole
3. The court enters a sentence of life or death and
may override the majority
of the jury and impose a
death sentence if the facts
suggesting a sentence of
death are so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could
differ
2. Both the state and the
defendant may put on all
evidence related to aggravating circumstances, statutory and non-statutory, as
well as any mitigating circumstances. There is no
requirement that the jury
weigh these circumstances
but the jury may consider
them.

1. The jury must

3. The jury's verdict as to
penalty must be unanimous.
2. The jury must consider

unanimously find the
existence of a statutory aggravating cir-

whether the mitigating
circumstances make the
imposition of the death

DENVER LAW REVIEW

Jury Instructions:
Idaho Criminal
Jury Instructions,
Nos. 1704, 1707,
1718

cumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt.
This is the State's
burden. However, the
State may introduce
other evidence of
aggravation.

penalty unjust. Whether or
not the death penalty is
unjust must be a unanimous decision although
the jury does not have to
unanimously agree on
which mitigating circumstances exist. Furthermore,
the existence of mitigating
circumstances need not be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

I

Indiana:
§ 3550-2-9 (2015)

IND. CODE

Jury Instructions:
Indiana Pattern
Jury Instructions,
Criminal Instruction Nos. 15.0060,
15.0180, 15.0200,
15.0280

1. The Jury must find
at least one statutory
aggravating factor
unanimously and
beyond a reasonable
doubt-burden on the
state. The jury instructions states that
the jury should consider both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. It is
unclear whether this
is meant to include
non-statutory aggravating circumstances.
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3. Jury must determine
which sentence is appropriate. If there is I statutory aggravating circumstance proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the
jury unanimously agrees
that the mitigating circumstances do not make the
imposition of the death
penalty unjust, then the
death penalty will be imposed
2. The jury must find that
any mitigating circumstance has been proven by
a preponderance of the
evidence, but it does not
have to be unanimous and
the burden is not assigned
"

702

3. The jury should consider
whether the mitigating
circumstances outweigh
the aggravating factor before recommending a penalty to the judge. Jury must
unanimously agree that the
aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating
circumstances to recommend a sentence of death.
4. The jury must unanimously recommend a sen-
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Kansas:
KAN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 21-6617, 216624, 21-6625
(2015)
Jury Instructions:

1. Jury must unanimously find a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt.
State has the burden
here.

-

Pattern Instructions Kansas
Criminal, Nos.
54.030, 54.040,
54.050, 54.060,
54.100

tence. If they cannot agree,
it proceeds as if the sentencing hearing were to the
court. The judge makes the
final decision as to sentence but a unanimous jury
finding is binding on the
court.
2. Jury must determine
whether the mitigating
circumstances outweigh
the proven statutory aggravating circumstances.
No burden of proof but the
jury instructions almost
suggest that the state bears
the burden of showing that
the aggravating circumstances is not outweighed
by any mitigating circumstances.

Kentucky:

1. Jury must find one

Ky. REV. STAT. §

statutory aggravating
factor proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Does not require unanimity or assign a
burden.

3. Jury must make a unanimous decision as to
whether or not to impose
the death penalty
2. Jury must weigh the
aggravating (statutory and
non-statutory) and mitigating circumstances but no
burden is given or assigned.
3. Jury recommends a sen-

1. Jury must find that

prison-to the judge who
imposes the sentence.
2. Jurors should consider

aggravating circum-

in rendering their verdict

905.3-.iexists beyond a
3(dreasonable doubt.

but there
circumstance
are no presumptions or burdens of proof

Case law suggests

ditermina
on.aJuranimous
with respect to mitigating

that the jury may only
consider statutory
aggravating circumstances.

circumstances.
3. A sentence of death
shall be imposed only up-

tence-death or life in

Louisiana:
CRIM.

LAO. CODEart

at least one statutory

mitigating circumstances
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I

+

-f

1. Jury must find that
the defendant killed,
attempted to kill, intended a killing take
place, or contemplated that lethal force
would be employed.

MISS. CODE ANN.

§§ 99-19-101, 103
(2015)

Mo. REV. STAT.

§§ 565.030, .032
(2015)

Montana:
MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 46-18-

301-305 (2015)

'I

2. The jury must
unanimously find that
the evidence in aggravation of punishment warrants imposing a death sentence
1. Trier of fact must
find one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; or
defendant plead
guilty and admitted to
an aggravating circumstancestatutes do not limit
this to statutory or
non-statutory aggravating circumstances

-,

-,

4. The jury must unanimously decide to impose
the death penalty. No burden of proof assigned.

2. Jury must unanimously find, beyond
a reasonable doubt,
the existence of one
or more statutory
aggravating circumstances.
1. The jury must
unanimously find at
least one statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt

Missouri:

tion of the iury
3. The jury must consider
whether the mitigating
circumstances outweigh
the aggravating circumstances. No burden of
proof assigned.

3. The jury must decide
whether there is evidence
in mitigation of punishment which outweighs the
evidence in aggravation
(statutory and nonstatutory) of punishment
4. The jury must decide,
under all the circumstances, whether to impose a
death sentence
+

Mississippi:
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2. The Court must consider
whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency
3. If there is one aggravating circumstance proven
beyond a reasonable doubt
and insufficient mitigating
circumstances to call for
leniency, the court shall
impose the death sentence

Nebraska:

1. The court must

2. The jury is then dis-

NEB. REV. STAT.

conduct an aggravation hearing where a

missed and a three-judge
panel is installed to deter-

§§ 29-2520-2523

jury must unammous-

mine the sentence. The
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ly find the existence
of an aggravating
circumstance beyond
a reasonable doubt. It
is unclear whether
this is limited to
statutory aggravating
circumstances or if
the jury can consider
any and all alleged
aggravating circumstances.

(2015)

court then holds a hearing
to consider the aggravating
factors the jury found and
receive evidence on mitigation and sentence excessiveness/disproportionality
3. The three-judge panel
must unanimously decide
to impose the death penalty after a careful consideration of:
(1) whether the aggravating circumstances as
determined to exist justify
imposition of a sentence of
death
(2) whether sufficient
mitigating circumstances
exist which approach or
exceed the weigh given to
the aggravating circumstances; or
(3) whether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant.

i

Nevada:
NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 175.552,
175.554, 175.556,

200.030, 200.033,
200.035, 200.170
(2015)

1. The jury must designate the statutory
aggravating circumstances it finds beyond a reasonable
doubt

2. The jury must consider
whether any mitigating
circumstances exist
3. The jury must consider
whether the mitigating
circumstances are sufficient enough to outweigh
the statutory aggravating
circumstances
4. The jury may impose a
sentence of death if it
unanimously finds the
existence of an aggravating circumstance(s) be-
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yond a reasonable doubt
and that any mitigating
circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance(s)
1. The state has the
burden of proving
beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of
an aggravating factor.
The statute contemplates statutory aggravating factors, but
allows the jury to
consider other aggravating factors so long
as notice has been
given.

New Hampshire:
N.H. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 630:5
(2015)

3. The defendant has the
burden of proving beyond
a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of a
mitigating factor
4. The jury then must consider whether the mitigating factors outweigh the
aggravating factors, or if
the aggravating factors are
sufficient to justify the
death penalty if there are
no mitigating factors

2. The jury must
unanimously agree on
the existence of an
aggravating factor
and that it was proven
beyond a reasonable
doubt

4

.4

North Carolina:
N.C. GEN. STAT. §

15A-2000 (2015)

5. If the jury concludes
that the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating
factors or that the aggravating factors, in the absence of any mitigating
factors, are themselves
sufficient to justify a death
sentence, the jury, by
unanimous vote only, may
recommend that a sentence
of death

1. The jury must
unanimously find the
existence of a statuto-

ry aggravating circumstance beyond a

reasonable doubt

2. Defendant has the burden of proving any mitigating circumstances by a
preponderance of the evidence
3. The jury must unanimously, and beyond a reasonable doubt, find that the
mitigating circumstances
are insufficient to outweigh the statutory aggravating circumstances in
order to impose the death
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1. To be death eligible, the jury must find
the defendant guilty
of aggravated murder
and one or more statutory aggravating
circumstances beyond
a reasonable doubtmust be unanimous

Ohio:
OHIO REV. CODE

ANN. §§ 2929.03.04 (West 2015)

OKLA. STAT. tit.

21, §§ 701.10-.12
(2015);

3. State has the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statutory
aggravating circumstances
that the defendant was
found guilty of are sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation of imposing the death penalty

4

4

Oklahoma:

penalty
2. Defendant has the burden to prove any factors in
mitigation of imposing the
death penalty

1. The jury must
unanimously, and

beyond a reasonable
doubt, find the existence of one or more
statutory aggravating
circumstances. State

4. If the jury finds, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
statutory aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances,
they shall impose the death
cenalty
2. No burden of proof or
unanimity required to determine existence of mitigating circumstances

3. In order to impose the
death penalty, the jury
Oklahoma Unimust unanimously find
has burden of proving
form Jury Instructhat the mitigating circumbeyond a reasonable
tions - Criminal,
stances are insufficient to
doubt
Nos. 4-69 , 4-70,
outweigh the statutory
4-72, 4-76, 4-78
aggravating factors that
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt
Oregon:
In the sentencing
The court also poses a
fourth question to the jury
phase, the jury may
OR.1EV. 6) STA. consider any and all at the close of evidence:
whether the defendant
relevant aggravating
should receive a death
and mitigating evidence. At the close of
sentence.
evidence, three quesThere is no burden of
tions are posed to the
proof assigned to this
jury:
but the jury must be
Jury Instructions:
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T

T

* (A) whether
the conduct of the
defendant that caused
the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and
with the reasonable
expectation that death
of the deceased or
another would result;

unanimous in finding
that it is the appropriate sentence

* (B) whether
there is a probability
that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute
a continuing threat to
society;

* (C) if raised
by the evidence,
whether the conduct
of the defendant in
killing the deceased
was unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.

Pennsylvania:
42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711
(2016)

The state has the burden to prove each of
these issues beyond a
reasonable doubt and
the jury must be
unanimous to answer
yes to any of these
questions.
1. State has the bur-

2. Defendant has the bur-

den of proving the
statutory aggravating
circumstances beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The jury must be
unanimous in finding
the statutory aggravating circumstances

den of proving any mitigating circumstances by a
preponderance of the evidence. The jury does not
have to be unanimous in
finding any mitigating
circumstances.
by a

beyond a reasonableita
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doubt

South Carolina:
S.C. CODE ANN. §

16-3-20 (2015)

South Dakota:
S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23A-

27A-1, -2, -4
(2015)

Tennessee:
TENN.TENN
CODE3 COD ANN

§39-13-204

1. The jury can consider evidence of any
mitigating circumstance allowed by
statute and law and
may only consider the
aggravating circumstances provided in
the statute
2. The jury must
unanimously find the
existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt
1. The jury will receive and consider
evidence of all mitigating circumstances
as well as evidence of
the statutory aggravating circumstances
2. The jury must find
the existence of a
statutory aggravating
circumstance beyond
a reasonable doubt
1. The jury must

sentence of death if the
jury unanimously finds at
least one statutory aggravating circumstances and
no mitigating circumstance
or if the jury unanimously
finds one or more aggravating circumstances
which outweigh any mitigating circumstances
Once the jury has found
the existence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt,
it may impose the death
penalty if the jury unanimously agree to impose
that sentence

If the jury finds at least
one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt and unanimously
recommends the sentence
to be death, the court shall
sentence the defendant to
death

2. The defendant does not

of proving
at have the burden
find statutory
unanimously
least one
a mitigating circumstances
and there is no jury una-

(2016);

aggravating circum-

stance beyond a rea-

nmilty requirement as to

Jury Instructions:

sonable doubt. The

any particular mitigating

Tennessee Pattern
Jury Instructions -

state has the burden
to prove this beyond ary

circumstance
may weigh the
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Texas:
TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art.

37.071 (West
2015)

At the conclusion of
evidence, the court
will submit two issues
to the jury:
(1) whether there is a
probability that the
defendant would
commit criminal acts
of violence that
would constitute a
continuing threat to
society; and
(2) in cases in which
the jury charge at the
guilt or innocence
state permitted the
jury to find the defendant guilty as a
party under sections
7.01 and 7.02 (criminal responsibility/complicity),
whether the defendant
actually caused the

[Vol. 93:3

proven statutory aggravating circumstances against
any and all evidence of
mitigating circumstances
4. The jury may impose a
penalty of death if they
unanimously find that the
state proved at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and this
circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
The state also bears the
burden of proving that the
aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating
ones beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The court shall instruct the
jury that if the jury returns
an affirmative finding to
each issue submitted under
Subsection (b), it shall
answer the following issue:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the
evidence, including the
circumstances of the offense, the defendant's
character and background,
and the personal moral
culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or
circumstances to warrant
that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole
rather than a death sentence be imposed.
* The jury must
unanimously answer no to
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death of the deceased
or did not actually
cause the death of the
deceased but intended
to kill the deceased or
another or anticipated
that a human life
would be taken
*

Utah:

The state bears
the burden of
proving these issues beyond a
reasonable doubt
and the jury must
unanimously answer yes to move
to the next step

1. Jury must find defendant guilty of a
capital felonyaggravated murder,
which includes the
statutory aggravating
circumstances

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-207 (West
2015)

Virginia:
I

1. Defendant found
guilty of an crime

this question to impose the
death penalty and no burden is assigned.
To impose the death penalty, the jury must unanimously answer yes to the
two special issues in the
eligibility phase and no to
the issue presented in the
selection phase.

2. Jury may consider all
relevant facts in aggravation or mitigation of the
penalty; suggests statutory
and non-statutory circumstances
3. The jury must unanimously find that the total
aggravation outweighs
total mitigation beyond a
reasonable doubt. State
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that, after considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the total
aggravation outweighs
total mitigation.
4. Jury must then unanimously find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the
imposition of the death
penalty is justified and
appropriate in this circumstance.
2. Jury must consider all
I evidence that the court
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§§ 19.2-264.2, .4,

§ 18.2-10 (2015)

[Vol. 93:3

deems relevant; admissible
evidence may include circumstances surround the
offense, the history and
background of the defendant, and any other facts in
mitigation of the offense
3. The penalty of death
shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
* there is a probability based upon evidence of
the prior history of the
defendant or of the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing serious threat
to society, or
* that his conduct in
committing the offense
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind
or aggravated battery to
the victim.
4. Jury must find these
aggravating circumstances
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and must unanimously agree to impose
the death penalty

Washington:

1. The defendant

WASH. REV. CODE

must be found guilty
of aggravated first
degree murder, which
is first degree murder

§§ 10.95.030
.050-080 (2015)
.2

2. The jury must consider
whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency.
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plus an aggravating
circumstance

Wyoming:
WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 6-2-102 (2015)

1. The jury must
unanimously find a
statutory aggravating
circumstance to exist

beyond a reasonable
doubt. State bears this
burden.

3. To impose the death
penalty, the jury must find,
unanimously and beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the
mitigating circumstances
are insufficient to merit
leniency.
2. The jury may consider
the evidence presented
considering statutory aggravating circumstances
and any mitigating circumstances relevant to the imposition of the sentence
3. Any mitigating circumstances must be proven by
a preponderance of the
evidence

Federal:
18 U.S.C. §§
3591-3593 (2012)

1. The jury must
unanimously find,
beyond a reasonable
doubt, the existence
of a statutory aggravating factor, or an
aggravating factor the
defendant has been
given notice of. The
state bears this burden.

4. A jury may impose the
death penalty if it unanimously agrees on the penalty after unanimously
finding a statutory aggravating circumstance proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and considering the
mitigating circumstances
proven by a preponderance
of the evidence
2. The defendant may present mitigating evidence
which must be proven by a
preponderance of the information.
3. The jury must consider
whether the aggravating
factors found to exist are
sufficient to outweigh the
mitigating factors so as to
impose a death penalty, or
if not mitigating circumstances, whether the aggravating circumstance on
its own is sufficient to
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warrant the death penalty
4. The jury must unanimously find that the death
penalty is the appropriate
sentence.

